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OFFICER: Okay, Mr. Faulkner, do you knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily waive these rights as I have read them out to you on this Miranda
warnings?
DEFENDANT: I don’t understand that. Could you translate that down for me?
OFFICER: Okay. Do you knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily, do you
know what I read you? Do you understand it? Are you intelligent enough to
understand what I’ve read you, and do you voluntarily waive these rights that
I’ve read you? Are you willing to talk to me?
DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.1

INTRODUCTION
In a typical criminal case involving a disputed confession, the following
scenario occurs: A suspect is brought to the police station. He is placed in a small
interrogation room. A detective reads the suspect Miranda warnings. The suspect
acknowledges the reading of the warnings. The suspect waives his Fifth Amendment rights.2 The suspect confesses. A few months later, an expert is consulted to
determine if the suspect actually understood those rights, and whether the suspect
“knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily”3 waived them. Perhaps the suspect has
manifested cognitive limitations or mental health issues.4 Psychological tests to
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1. Faulkner v. State, 727 S.W.2d 793, 798 (Tex. Ct. App. 1987).
2. “No person shall be . . . compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.” U.S. CONST. amend.
V.
3. In Johnson v. Zerbst, the Supreme Court recognized that waiver involves the “intentional relinquishment or
abandonment of a known right or privilege.” 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938).
4. Such limitations can include an intellectual disability, cognitive disorders, traumatic brain injury, or severe
mental illness. See, e.g., Virginia G. Cooper & Patricia A. Zapf, Psychiatric Patients’ Comprehension of Miranda
Rights, 32 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 390, 392 (2008); William C. Follette, Deborah Davis & Richard A. Leo, Mental
Health Status and Vulnerability to Police Interrogation Tactics, 22 CRIM. JUST. 42, 44–45 (2007); Solomon M.
Fulero & Caroline Everington, Assessing the Capacity of Persons with Mental Retardation to Waive Miranda
Rights: A Jurisprudent Therapy Perspective, 28 LAW & PSYCHOL. REV. 53, 55 (2004).
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determine the intelligent, knowing, and voluntary waiver are conducted.5 Based on
the expert evaluation and test results, the suspect challenges his confession in
court. Months later, the ultimate question of the adequacy of the knowing,
intelligent, or voluntary waiver is litigated before the trial judge. The court must
then make a legal determination based on a “totality of circumstances” standard6
about whether the waiver was valid.7
The question remains: What did the suspect know and understand at the time of
the interrogation? The central tension in any disputed confession case arises from
the fact that the tests to evaluate the suspect’s knowing, intelligent, and voluntary
waiver are conducted months after the relevant time of the interrogation.8 Months
later, a suspect might know his rights from having talked to a family member,
lawyer, or “jail house lawyer.”9 Months later, a suspect might misrepresent his
actual knowledge recognizing that the confession is detrimental to his case.10
While expert evaluation and testing is necessary to make a determination after the
fact, what controls the legal determination is the suspect’s knowledge and
understanding of his rights at the time of the interrogation.11
This tension exists because current Miranda practice fails to develop an
adequate record of a suspect’s knowledge and understanding at the time of the
waiver.12 Even with perfect recording technology, current Miranda practice
involves what is essentially a one-way explanation. The police officer conveys
Miranda rights to the suspect through a formalized recitation of the warnings.13

5. See, e.g., THOMAS GRISSO, EVALUATING COMPETENCIES: FORENSIC ASSESSMENTS AND INSTRUMENTS 150 (2d
ed. 2003) [hereinafter GRISSO, EVALUATING COMPETENCIES]; Thomas Grisso, Juveniles’ Capacities to Waive
Miranda Rights: An Empirical Analysis, 68 CALIF. L. REV. 1134, 1143–44 (1980).
6. See Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 725 (1979) (recognizing that Miranda waiver analysis is determined
by a “totality of circumstances” test incorporating all relevant factors); see also Fulero & Everington, supra note
4, at 55 (“The ‘totality of circumstances test’ requires that the court consider such factors as IQ, chronological age,
suspect’s education, suspect’s previous experience in the criminal justice system and previous experience with
entering a waiver of rights in a confession.”).
7. Bruce Frumkin, Competency to Waive Miranda Rights: Clinical and Legal Issues, 24 A.B.A. MENTAL &
PHYSICAL DISABILITY L. REP. 326, 326 (2000) [hereinafter Frumkin, Competency] (legal understanding of waiver
is determined by analyzing “[a]n individual’s maturity, cognitive capabilities, or level of mental illness”).
8. See GRISSO, EVALUATING COMPETENCIES, supra note 5, at 167.
9. See I. Bruce Frumkin, Psychological Evaluation in Miranda Waiver and Confession Cases, in CLINICAL
NEUROPSYCHOLOGY IN THE CRIMINAL FORENSIC SETTING 135, 141 (Robert L. Denny & James P. Sullivan eds.,
2008) [hereinafter Frumkin, Psychological Evaluation] (“If an attorney educates the client by speaking about the
rights that should have been invoked when with the police, it is more difficult for the psychologist to extrapolate
from the defendant’s current knowledge what he or she knew when interacting with the police.”); see also id. at
145 (“An individual may well understand the rights currently but may not have been able to do so at the time of
the police interrogation. The defendant may have been subsequently educated on Miranda by defense counsel or
by other inmates.”).
10. See GRISSO, EVALUATING COMPETENCIES, supra note 5, at 160.
11. See id. at 156.
12. See WELSH S. WHITE, MIRANDA’S WANING PROTECTIONS: POLICE INTERROGATION PRACTICES AFTER DICKERSON 190–93 (2001) (proposing electronically recording interrogations to protect defendants’ Miranda rights).
13. See, e.g., Berghuis v. Thompkins, 130 S. Ct. 2250, 2256 (2010) (“At the beginning of the interrogation, one
of the officers . . . presented [the defendant] with a [waiver] form derived from the Miranda rule.”).
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Usually this is done through a reading and signing of a pre-printed Miranda waiver
form or card.14 As detailed in Faulkner v. State excerpted at the outset of this
Article, in practice a suspect must acknowledge the warnings, but need not do
more.15 As a result, courts cannot easily assess the extent to which a suspect knew,
understood, and willingly relinquished constitutional rights.16 Judges are left
evaluating proxies for this information—the suspect’s intelligence (as measured
by intelligence quotient or “IQ”), age, education level, and experience with the
criminal justice system.17 While these are all important factors, they cannot replace
information about the suspect’s actual state of knowledge and intelligent understanding at the time of waiver.
This Article proposes a new “dialogue approach” to resolve this tension and
limit the ambiguity in disputed waivers, especially for vulnerable suspects. The
dialogue approach would require suspects to confirm their understanding18 of the
rights and the consequences of the waiver by restating the rights in their own
words at the time of the interrogation. In addition, it would require a brief
interchange between the police and the suspect about the purpose of rights and the
roles of the participants in the interrogation. It changes the Miranda waiver
process from a one-way presentation to a two-way dialogue. This approach would
give police officers the tools to understand whether the suspect really does
understand his or her constitutional rights. It would also give courts and experts
more accurate data to make findings about the adequacy of waiver. The result
would be a real-time test of waiver that could inform the court’s ultimate legal
conclusion about the knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver of constitutional
rights.
Two recent developments in law and forensic psychology frame this proposal.
First, in three recent opinions, the Supreme Court has reconceptualized the
contours of how police officers should give Miranda warnings.19 In Florida v.
Powell, the Supreme Court held that Miranda warnings need not be formalized
with the same language in every jurisdiction, so long as the officer reasonably

14. Cf. id.
15. See Faulkner v. State, 727 S.W.2d 793 (Tex. Ct. App. 1987); see also Thompkins, 130 S. Ct. at 2264
(determining that after a suspect acknowledges the warnings, “police may interrogate a suspect who has neither
invoked nor waived his or her Miranda rights”).
16. Almost by definition, by the time a court is required to decide on the constitutional issue of waiver, the
following events have occurred: (1) the defendant has waived his/her rights, (2) the defendant has contested the
validity of the waiver, and (3) the police officer has proffered that rights were given and properly waived.
17. See Morgan Cloud et al., Words Without Meaning: The Constitution, Confessions, and Mentally Retarded
Suspects, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 495, 528–30 (2002) (discussing each of these factors in turn); Fulero & Everington,
supra note 4, at 55.
18. As will be discussed, “understanding” includes both a knowing and intelligent waiver. The issue of
voluntariness will not be the subject of this Article.
19. See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, The Roberts Court and Criminal Procedure at Age Five, 43 TEX. TECH L.
REV. 13, 19 (2010) (“It is impossible to reconcile the Supreme Court’s decision in Berghuis v. Thompkins with
Miranda v. Arizona.”).
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communicates the rights to the suspect.20 In Berghuis v. Thompkins21 and Montejo
v. Louisiana,22 the Supreme Court required the suspect affirmatively to invoke the
right to silence and the right to counsel, respectively.23 Prior to Berghuis, it would
have been unnecessary for a suspect to say anything, let alone communicate his
understanding of his right to silence.24 The suspect could have remained silent,
neither having to invoke his right nor having his comments interpreted as an
implied waiver of rights.25 Now he must communicate with the officer.26 Taken
together, these cases allow for a more informal process that requires communication between the suspect and the interrogating officers. In addition, all three
decisions reaffirm, with rather emphatic language, the predicate foundation that all
waivers be knowing, intelligent, and voluntary.27 Thus, within a more flexible
approach to Miranda, there now exists a communicative space for a dialogue about
what those rights mean to the suspect—especially a vulnerable suspect with
cognitive, developmental, or other limitations.
Significantly, these legal decisions have developed in parallel with an emerging
scientific consensus on interrogations and confessions.28 The 2010 “White Paper”
entitled Police Induced Confessions: Risk Factors and Recommendations sets
forth the accepted scientific understanding of the issues surrounding disputed
confessions.29 This White Paper was commissioned by the American Psychology
Law Society and consists of an extensive meta-survey of existing scholarship on
the subject. Among other subjects, the report addresses the centrality of suspects’
understanding of Miranda rights prior to waiver.30 Additional research from social

20. 130 S. Ct. 1195 (2010).
21. 130 S. Ct. 2250 (2010).
22. 556 U.S. 778 (2009).
23. See also Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452 (1994). In Montejo and Davis, the Court required the suspect
affirmatively to invoke his right to counsel. See Montejo, 556 U.S. 778; Davis, 512 U.S. 452.
24. See Berghuis, 130 S. Ct. at 2269–70 & n.4 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (listing prior cases requiring the
satisfaction of a “heavy burden” to prove waiver); see also id. at 2276 (“What in the world must an individual do
to exercise his constitutional right to remain silent beyond actually, in fact, remaining silent?” (citing Soffar v.
Cockrell, 300 F.3d 588, 603 (5th Cir. 2002) (en banc) (DeMoss, J., dissenting))).
25. The question whether a suspect has validly waived his right is “entirely distinct” as a matter of law from
whether he invoked that right. See Smith v. Illinois, 469 U.S. 91, 97–98 (1984) (per curiam). The questions are
related, however, in terms of the practical effect on the exercise of a suspect’s rights. See id.
26. See Berghuis, 130 S. Ct. at 2264.
27. See id. at 2260–61; Powell, 130 S. Ct. at 1200–01; Montejo, 556 U.S. at 786. See generally Maryland v.
Shatzer, 130 S. Ct. 1213, 1219 (2010) (noting that “[t]o establish a valid waiver, the State must show that the
waiver was knowing, intelligent and voluntary”); Colorado v. Spring, 479 U.S. 564, 572 (1987) (“[A] suspect may
waive his Fifth Amendment privilege, ‘provided the waiver is made voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently.’”
(quoting Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966))); Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 421 (1986) (finding
waiver inquiry as consisting of two separate inquiries: whether the waiver was voluntary and whether the waiver
was knowingly and intelligently made); Miranda, 384 U.S. 436.
28. See infra Part II.
29. Saul M. Kassin et al., Police-Induced Confessions: Risk Factors and Recommendations, 34 LAW & HUM.
BEHAV. 3, 4 (2010) [hereinafter Kassin et al., White Paper].
30. See id.
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scientists and forensic psychologists on waiver issues has now reached a level of
sophistication such that these studies and evaluations have been presented in
courts across the country.31 These studies validate the techniques developed to
evaluate whether there was a knowing and intelligent waiver of Miranda warnings,
and provide guidance for this Article’s proposed solution.
This Article seeks to provide a new framework to address the problem of
evaluating a knowing and intelligent waiver of Miranda warnings at the time of
interrogation.32 It focuses primarily on interrogations occurring in formal interrogation rooms33 and with proper recording devices to record the waiver of rights.34
The “dialogue approach” requires an inquiry into a suspect’s comprehension of his
or her constitutional rights at the time the Miranda warnings are read by police
interrogators.35 Similar to the well-established tests designed by Dr. Thomas
Grisso36 for evaluating a knowing and intelligent waiver, the dialogue approach
would require the suspect to explain in his or her own words what the rights
mean.37 An interrogating officer would be required to ask the suspect both to
articulate the meaning of the words and concepts just stated and briefly explain
their relevance to the current interrogation. In doing so, a record could be
established about the base-line comprehension of the suspect at the relevant time.
The suspect’s answers might, but would not necessarily, result in a continued
discussion between suspect and police officer about the meaning of the constitutional rights at issue.38 Whether or not a dialogue continued, the process would
create a more complete record for experts and judges upon which to base a
scientific or legal conclusion.
This proposal is consistent with current research on disputed confessions,39 rests
on a scientifically and legally accepted practice for testing a knowing and

31. See I. Bruce Frumkin & Alfredo Garcia, Psychological Evaluations and the Competency to Waive Miranda
Rights, CHAMPION MAG., Nov. 2003, at 20 (“The Grisso tests would appear to have no difficulty meeting a
Daubert standard for admissibility.”).
32. The term “interrogation” here is used broadly. Many standard interrogation procedures begin well before
the actual conversation with the suspect and well before the reading of rights. For purposes of this Article, I use
the term to mean both the entire interaction between police and suspect (including waiting time, Miranda
warnings, and conversation), and the actual discussion between the two parties.
33. Miranda warnings, of course, happen outside of interrogation rooms. The proposed dialogue approach
discussed here is applicable to those settings, although with some modifications. The focus of this Article,
however, is on interrogations in interrogation rooms.
34. As will be discussed later, the need to videotape the waiver process is critical to the analysis. See infra Part
IV.
35. See infra Part III.
36. See generally GRISSO, EVALUATING COMPETENCIES, supra note 5, at 164–92.
37. See infra Part III.A.1 (explaining the various Grisso assessment mechanisms).
38. See infra Part III.
39. See infra Part II; see also Cloud et al., supra note 17, at 499 (presenting an empirical analysis of disputed
confessions); Fulero & Everington, supra note 4, at 59–60 (discussing current research); Richard Rogers et al.,
“Everybody Knows Their Miranda Rights”: Implicit Assumptions and Countervailing Evidence, 16 PSYCHOL.
PUB. POL’Y & L. 300, 302 (2010) [hereinafter Rogers et al., Everybody Knows].
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intelligent waiver,40 and is responsive to the Supreme Court’s recent commentary
on Miranda warnings.41 More importantly, it resolves the central tension in many
disputed confession cases without disturbing foundational constitutional protections or interfering with legitimate law enforcement interrogation. Suspects,
experts, litigants, and courts will all be better informed about the facts underlying
the legal determination of constitutional waiver.
Part I of this Article sets out the legal issues involved in a knowing, intelligent,
and voluntary waiver of Miranda rights. Part II sets out the current scientific
understanding of Miranda comprehension tests as well as their applicability and
admissibility in court. This Part surveys the scientific consensus on waiver in the
forensic psychology community focused on vulnerable populations, such as
suspects with intellectual disabilities, mental illness, and juveniles. Part III
addresses the specific problem of waiver with vulnerable populations and proposes
a new framework through a dialogue approach. While the dialogue approach
applies to all suspects, it is particularly appropriate for use with vulnerable
suspects. This Part also examines a representative interrogation that showcases a
dialogue-friendly interrogation. Part IV addresses some of the constitutional
concerns of this approach, as well as the practical difficulties in implementing any
new Miranda requirement. The last Part offers some suggestions to courts and law
enforcement professionals in assessing the fundamental components of any valid
waiver.
I. RECENT SUPREME COURT DEVELOPMENTS: AN INVITATION TO DIALOGUE
Read in one way, the Supreme Court’s 2009 and 2010 terms present both a
reaffirmation of core Miranda principles42 and an acceptance of a more flexible
approach to conducting custodial interrogations. The Powell, Berghuis, Montejo
trilogy43 adopts the Miranda framework for analyzing custodial interrogations.
These cases acknowledge the central concern of coercion arising from custodial
interrogation.44 They emphasize the predicate requirement that a suspect must
understand his or her Fifth Amendment rights prior to waiving them, and reaffirm

40. See Frumkin & Garcia, supra note 31, at 16 (discussing the Grisso tests as accepted methodologies for
assessing waivers).
41. See infra Part I.
42. Some commentators have expressed concern that the cases undermine, rather than strengthen, the
protections underlying Miranda. See, e.g., Barry Friedman, The Wages of Stealth Overruling (with Particular
Attention to Miranda v. Arizona), 99 GEO. L.J. 1 (2010); Charles Weisselberg & Stephanos Bibas, Debate, The
Right to Remain Silent, 159 U. PA. L. REV. PENNUMBRA 69 (2010) (debating the effect of Berghuis v. Thompkins
on the Miranda doctrine). Yet, the continued attention to the warning process itself has remained central to the
protections of the Fifth Amendment.
43. See Florida v. Powell, 130 S. Ct. 1195 (2010); Berghuis v. Thompkins, 130 S. Ct. 2250 (2010); Montejo v.
Louisiana, 556 U.S. 778 (2009).
44. Powell, 130 S. Ct. at 1203; Berghuis, 130 S. Ct. at 2263–64; Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 424 (1986)
(recognizing that the purpose of Miranda warnings “is to dissipate the compulsion inherent in custodial
interrogation and, in so doing, guard against abridgment of the suspect’s Fifth Amendment rights”); see Richard J.
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that it is the government’s burden to demonstrate such a voluntary, knowing, and
intelligent waiver of rights.45
Yet, within that reaffirmation of established Fifth Amendment principles, the
procedures protecting those rights were subtly, but importantly, altered.46 As will
be examined below, the Supreme Court in Powell allowed police more latitude in
choosing the words used to convey the constitutional warnings.47 In Berghuis, the
Supreme Court held that a suspect must affirmatively and unambiguously invoke
his or her right to silence by clearly informing the police officers of this request.48
And, as will be discussed, the Montejo decision emphasized the necessity of a
suspect asserting his or her Miranda rights, even in circumstances where Miranda
assertions were previously unnecessary.49
These changes invite a new element into the Miranda warning recitation—
communication. Under Powell, the interrogating officer now has more liberty to
explain the rights, without fear that a deviation from the rote recitation will result
in invaliding the waiver. Similarly, under Berghuis and Montejo, the suspect now
must communicate his or her acknowledgment of the rights to the officer in order
to gain protection from those warnings. In both instances, the two parties to the
interrogation have been given the ability to communicate their understanding of
the rights at issue.
It is within this communicative space that the dialogue approach to Miranda
waiver is born. Expanding on the opening granted by the Court’s recent decisions,
the dialogue approach encourages police officers to make sure that suspects,
particularly vulnerable suspects, understand their Miranda rights. As explained in
detail below, this dialogue approach is consistent with core Fifth Amendment
principles and the Supreme Court’s existing Miranda decisions.
A. The Fifth Amendment’s Self-Incrimination Clause and Miranda Warnings
The Fifth Amendment provides that “no person . . . shall be compelled in any
criminal case to be a witness against himself.”50 As a historical matter, the
Self-Incrimination Clause “was directed at the employment of legal process to

Ofshe & Richard A. Leo, The Decision to Confess Falsely: Rational Choice and Irrational Action, 74 DENV. U. L.
REV. 979 (1997).
45. Miranda acknowledged the “heavy burden” that “rests on the government to demonstrate that the
defendant knowingly and intelligently waived his privilege against self-incrimination and his right to retained or
appointed counsel.” 384 U.S. 436, 475 (1966); see Maryland v. Shatzer, 130 S. Ct. 1213, 1219 (2010) (“To
establish a valid waiver, the State must show that the waiver was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary under the
high standard of proof for the waiver of constitutional rights set forth in Johnson v. Zerbest, 304 U.S. 458
[(1938)] . . . .” (citations omitted)); North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369, 373 (1979); Brewer v. Williams, 430
U.S. 387, 404 (1977) (“[C]ourts indulge in every reasonable presumption against waiver.” (citations omitted)).
46. See infra Part I.B–D.
47. Powell, 130 S. Ct. at 1204.
48. Berghuis v. Thompkins, 130 S. Ct. 2250, 2260 (2010).
49. Montejo v. Louisiana, 556 U.S. 778 (2009).
50. U.S. CONST. amend.V.
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extract from the person’s own lips an admission of guilt, which would thus take the
place of other evidence.”51 The common law roots of the privilege against
self-incrimination primarily focused on the coerced confession itself and the fact
that such a coerced confession was “inherently untrustworthy.”52
Evolving from a due process concern that a suspect’s “will was overborne by the
circumstances surrounding the giving of the confession,”53 the Miranda decision
recognized that custodial interrogation itself can be inherently coercive.54 To
alleviate that coercive effect, Miranda warnings, explaining the right to silence,
right to an attorney, and legal consequences of speaking to the officer, must be
provided.55 Miranda “laid down concrete constitutional guidelines for law enforcement agencies and courts to follow.”56 “Miranda requires procedures that will
warn a suspect in custody of his right to remain silent and which will assure the
suspect that the exercise of that right will be honored.”57
If the justification for Miranda warnings is to counteract the inherently coercive
environment of the custodial setting (to protect against coerced self-incrimination),58 the “main purpose of Miranda is to ensure that an accused is advised of
and understands the right to remain silent and the right to counsel.”59 These dual
goals find a shared analytical home in the Court’s waiver analysis;
The waiver inquiry “has two distinct dimensions”: waiver must be “voluntary
in the sense that it was the product of a free and deliberate choice rather than
intimidation, coercion, or deception,” and “made with a full awareness of both
the nature of the right being abandoned and the consequences of the decision to
abandon it.”60

In other words, Miranda has both empowering and educating purposes, and both
component parts require real understanding (“full awareness”) of the constitu51. See United States v. Patane, 542 U.S. 630, 637 (2004) (internal citation and emphasis omitted).
52. Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 433 (2000).
53. Id. at 434 (quoting Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 226 (1973)).
54. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467 (1966); see Ofshe & Leo, supra note 44 (analyzing how confessions
are elicited through interrogation of criminal suspects).
55. Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 435 (stating that custodial interrogation is inherently coercive in its isolation and
pressure, and thus it “exacts a heavy toll on individual liberty and trades on the weakness of individuals”).
56. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 441–42; see, e.g., Yale Kamisar, On the Fortieth Anniversary of the Miranda Case:
Why We Needed It, How We Got It—And What Happened to It, 5 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 163, 167 (2007); Richard A.
Leo, The Impact of Miranda Revisited, 86 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 621, 663 (1996); George C. Thomas, III,
Stories About Miranda, 102 MICH. L. REV. 1959, 1975–76 (2004); George C. Thomas, III, Miranda’s Illusion:
Telling Stories in the Police Interrogation Room, 81 TEX. L. REV. 1091, 1092 (2003).
57. Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 442. Miranda arose from a concern about “all interrogation practices which are
likely to exert such pressure upon an individual as to disable him from making a free and rational choice.”
Miranda, 384 U.S. at 464–65.
58. See Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 426 (1986) (“Miranda attempted to reconcile these opposing
concerns by giving the defendant the power to exert some control over the course of the interrogation.” (emphasis
omitted)).
59. Berghuis v. Thompkins, 130 S. Ct. 2250, 2261 (2010) (emphasis added).
60. Id. at 2260 (quoting Burbine, 475 U.S. at 421).
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tional protections at issue.61 As will be discussed in the next three subsections, the
Supreme Court’s recent Miranda decisions affect all aspects of the traditional
Miranda waiver analysis including a suspect’s understanding of the rights, the
police officer’s advisement of the rights, and the requirement to invoke Miranda
rights.
1. “Understanding” Miranda Waiver
To validly waive one’s constitutional rights, a suspect must understand the
nature of those rights, and be able to make an informed decision about whether to
waive or invoke those rights.62 The chosen language of “knowing, intelligent, and
voluntary”63 must be understood as three separate requirements, with three
separate standards.64 A “knowing” waiver of rights centers on a suspect’s comprehension of the rights.65 An “intelligent” waiver centers on a suspect’s ability to
weigh and deliberate on the consequences of the rights.66 An intelligent waiver is
distinguished from a knowing waiver by the element of ongoing, volitional choice
involved in the decision, rather than simply acknowledging the existence of
rights.67 As the Supreme Court has recognized, “The fundamental purpose of the
Court’s decision in Miranda was ‘to assure that the individual’s right to choose
between speech and silence remains unfettered throughout the interrogation
process.’”68 Finally, a voluntary waiver involves evaluating whether the waiver or

61. See North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369, 373 (1979) (“An express or oral statement of waiver of the right
to remain silent or of the right to counsel is usually strong proof of the validity of that waiver, but is not inevitably
either necessary or sufficient to establish waiver. The question is not one of form, but rather whether the defendant
in fact knowingly and voluntarily waived the rights delineated in the Miranda case.”).
62. See Connecticut v. Barrett, 479 U.S. 523, 528 (1987) (“The fundamental purpose of the Court’s decision in
Miranda was ‘to assure that the individual’s right to choose between speech and silence remains unfettered
throughout the interrogation process.’” (quoting Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 469 (1966) (emphasis in
original))); see, e.g., Morgan Cloud, Ignorance and Democracy, 39 TEX. TECH L. REV. 1143, 1147 (2007);
William J. Stuntz, Miranda’s Mistake, 99 MICH. L. REV. 975, 993 (2001); Charles D. Weisselberg, Mourning
Miranda, 96 CALIF. L. REV. 1519, 1521, 1525 (2008).
63. See Maryland v. Shatzer, 130 S. Ct. 1213, 1219 (2010) (recognizing the standard as “knowing, intelligent,
and voluntary”).
64. See Frumkin, Psychological Evaluation, supra note 9, at 138 (discussing the mental competency necessary
to waive Miranda rights).
65. GRISSO, EVALUATING COMPETENCIES, supra note 5, at 151; see Frumkin, Psychological Evaluation, supra
note 9, at 138–39.
66. See Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 421 (1986) (stating that waiver must be “the product of a free and
deliberate choice . . . made with a full awareness of both the nature of the right being abandoned and the
consequences of the decision to abandon it”); see also United States v. Garibay, 143 F.3d 534, 537–40 (9th Cir.
1998) (discussing language barrier in understanding Miranda rights); United States v. Short, 790 F.2d 464, 469
(6th Cir. 1986) (same).
67. See Barrett, 479 U.S. at 528; see also GRISSO, EVALUATING COMPETENCIES, supra note 5, at 152–53;
Frumkin, Psychological Evaluation, supra note 9, at 138–39.
68. Barrett, 479 U.S. at 528; see Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 308 (1985) (“Once warned, the suspect is free
to exercise his own volition in deciding whether or not to make a statement to the authorities.” (emphasis added)).
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confession was “the product of an essentially free and unconstrained choice by its
maker.”69
The requirement of full understanding—meeting both the knowing and intelligent prongs—has been repeatedly acknowledged in decisions since Miranda was
issued.70 As the Supreme Court recognized in Colorado v. Spring, “[W]aiver must
have been made with a full awareness both of the nature of the right being
abandoned and the consequences of the decision to abandon it.”71 Full understanding was also a central assumption behind the Berghuis, Montejo and Powell
opinions, which repeatedly emphasized the importance of the foundational steps of
informing a suspect of his or her rights, and making sure that the suspect
knowingly and intelligently understood those rights.72
The Supreme Court in Berghuis, per Justice Kennedy, made this baseline
requirement of “understanding” explicitly clear, repeating the requirement of
“understanding” half a dozen times throughout the opinion.73 More pointedly, the
Berghuis Court acknowledged that the constitutional prophylaxis of merely
informing a suspect of his or her rights is not enough: “If the State establishes that
a Miranda warning was given and the accused made an uncoerced statement, this
showing, standing alone, is insufficient to demonstrate ‘a valid waiver’ of Miranda
rights. The prosecution must make the additional showing that the accused
understood these rights.”74 Thus stated, it is not enough for an officer to simply
read the litany of words on the rights form in the hopes that the words convey the
intended meaning,75 but there must be some “additional showing” of understanding.76 In other words, there must be both a “factual understanding” and a
“contextual understanding”—meaning an understanding of the relevance of those
rights at the time of the interrogation.77 While this does not mean that understand69. Schenckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 225 (1973) (quoting Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568, 602
(1961)).
70. See, e.g., Maryland v. Shatzer, 130 S. Ct. 1213, 1219 (2010); Duckworth v. Egan, 492 U.S. 195, 215 (1989)
(Marshall, J., dissenting); Colorado v. Spring, 479 U.S. 564, 572 (1987); Barrett, 479 U.S. at 528; Burbine, 475
U.S. at 421.
71. 479 U.S. at 573 (quoting Burbine, 475 U.S. at 421).
72. See Berghuis v. Thompkins, 130 S. Ct. 2250 (2010); Montejo v. Louisiana, 556 U.S. 778 (2009); Powell v.
Florida, 130 S. Ct. 1195 (2010).
73. See Berghuis, 130 S. Ct. at 2261–64.
74. Id. at 2261 (citing Spring, 479 U.S. at 473–75). Of course, in the context of the Berghuis holding that the
suspect implicitly waived his rights, some might take a more cynical view of the Court’s emphasis on
understanding as meaning little in practice.
75. See id. at 2261.
76. See id.; see also Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600, 613–14 (2004) (plurality opinion) (“[W]hen Miranda
warnings are inserted in the midst of coordinated and continuing interrogation, they are likely to mislead and
depriv[e] a defendant of knowledge essential to his ability to understand the nature of his rights and the
consequences of abandoning them.” (citations and internal quotation marks omitted)). But see Sandra Guerra
Thompson, Evading Miranda: How Seibert and Patane Failed to “Save” Miranda, 40 VAL. U. L. REV. 645, 647
(2006).
77. This factual and contextual analysis roughly corresponds with the knowing and intelligent waiver analysis
well established in the case law.
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ing must include a complete understanding of the scope of interrogation,78 it does
mean a full understanding of the scope of the constitutional rights at issue. As will
be detailed throughout this Article, one way to make that “additional showing”
would be to ask the suspect about his current “understanding” of those rights
immediately after reading the warnings.79
The Berghuis Court focused in large part on the phenomenon of an implicit
waiver by a suspect whom the Court assumed had understood those rights.80 The
Court held that waiver can be presumed in the case of an individual who “acts in a
manner inconsistent with [the] exercise”81 of those rights, and waiver “can be
implied through the defendant’s silence.”82 The Court made clear that both
situations presuppose “full understanding of his or her rights.”83 Significantly, the
Court did not hold that silence from an uncomprehending suspect would suffice for
a constitutionally sufficient waiver.84 Such a holding would be inconsistent with its
previous waiver cases.85 Instead, the Court concluded, “[i]n sum, a suspect who
has received and understood the Miranda warnings, and has not invoked his
Miranda rights, waives the right to remain silent by making an uncoerced
statement to the police.”86
The Berghuis Court’s emphasis on understanding was not accidental. The only
plausible way to interpret a suspect’s near three-hours of silence and explicit
refusal to sign a Miranda waiver form as an implicit waiver was to presume that
during that entire time the suspect understood the relevant application of his rights
and simply chose not to invoke them.87 The Court recognized that “full comprehension of the rights to remain silent and request an attorney are sufficient to dispel
whatever coercion in the interrogation process.”88 In fact, the Court made the point
that because of the full comprehension of the rights, a suspect enjoys an almost
deliberative moment to “consider the choices he or she faces” and “reassess his or
her immediate and long term interests” during a lengthy interrogation process.89 If

78. Spring, 479 U.S. at 573 (quoting Burbine, 475 U.S. at 421).
79. See infra Part III.
80. See Berghuis, 130 S. Ct. 2250.
81. Id. at 2262 (“As a general proposition, the law can presume that an individual who, with a full
understanding of his or her rights, acts in a manner inconsistent with their exercise has made a deliberate choice to
relinquish those rights.” (emphasis added)).
82. Id. at 2261 (“Butler made clear that a waiver of Miranda rights may be implied through ‘the defendant’s
silence, coupled with an understanding of his rights and a course of conduct indicating waiver.’” (quoting North
Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369, 373 (1979) (emphasis added))). For the Court, the defendant’s statements two
hours and forty-five minutes into the interrogation were proof of that waiver. Id. at 2262–63.
83. Id. at 2262 (emphasis added).
84. See id. at 2264.
85. See, e.g., Butler, 441 U.S. at 373; Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467–68 (1966).
86. Berghuis, 130 S. Ct. at 2264 (emphasis added).
87. In Berghuis, the defendant remained silent for the first two hours and forty-five minutes of the
interrogation. See id. at 2262.
88. Id. at 2260 (citing Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 427 (1986)) (emphasis added).
89. Id. at 2264.
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accepted as an accurate assessment of a suspect’s thought process, this emphasis
on deliberation and weighing of rights, choices, and decision-making places a
heavy burden on the “intelligent” prong of the waiver analysis. This contextual
analysis allowed the Court to conclude that “there is no contention that Thompkins
did not understand his rights.”90 In doing so, the Court elevated an existing
foundational requirement of full understanding to a heightened position of importance.91
The Supreme Court’s emphasis on the predicate requirement of understanding
Miranda rights also exists in Montejo v. Louisiana, albeit in a less direct fashion.92
Similar to Berghuis, the Court in Montejo assumed the centrality of understanding
the Miranda warnings in its analysis overruling Michigan v. Jackson.93 At issue
was whether the appointment of counsel created the presumption that any
subsequent Miranda waiver should be considered invalid.94 The Court reaffirmed
that any waiver of the right to counsel must be “voluntary, knowing and intelligent.”95
As proof of the importance of this factor, the Court remanded the case to allow
Mr. Montejo to pursue a claim that his waiver was not knowing and voluntary,
based on alleged misrepresentations by the interrogating officers.96 As the Court
recognized, the issue of waiver “ha[s] heightened importance in light of our
opinion today.”97 The reason why the issue of waiver has “heightened importance”
after Montejo is that the Court assumed that properly given Miranda warnings
will adequately inform suspects about both their Fifth and Sixth Amendment
rights to counsel.98 This is so even post-indictment and post-appointment of

90. Id. at 2262.
91. In one reading of the Berghuis decision, the Court made a suspect’s “understanding” do the constitutional
work of both dispelling the coercive effects of the interrogative environment and meeting the “additional
showing” requirement. See id. at 2263 (“This holding makes sense given that the primary protection afforded
suspects subjected to custodial interrogation is the Miranda warnings themselves. The Miranda rule and its
requirements are met if a suspect receives adequate Miranda warnings, understands them, and has an opportunity
to invoke the rights before giving any answers or admissions.” (citations and internal quotation marks omitted)).
92. 556 U.S. 778, 798 (2009); see Adams v. State, 995 A.2d 763, 774–75 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2010)
(discussing the Montejo decision); State v. Forbush, 796 N.W.2d 741, 750–53 (Wis. 2011) (same).
93. See Montejo, 556 U.S. at 798 (overruling Michigan v. Jackson, 475 U.S. 625 (1986)).
94. In Montejo, the Supreme Court rejected the reasoning of the Louisiana Supreme Court which had held that
because the defendant did not specifically request counsel at the arraignment, the Sixth Amendment protections of
Michigan v. Jackson did not apply. See id. The Supreme Court recognized that such a rule would create confusion
due to the differing appointment mechanisms in the various states. See id. The Supreme Court then went on to
reverse the existing precedent of Michigan v. Jackson based on the reasoning that the protections of Miranda v.
Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (1981), and Minnick v. Mississippi, 498 U.S. 146
(1990) provide sufficient protection. See id. at 794.
95. Id. at 786.
96. See id. at 798.
97. Id.
98. As the Supreme Court has made clear, the right to counsel under the Sixth Amendment protects a defendant
at all critical stages of a criminal proceeding. See id. at 786 (citations omitted). This right is analytically distinct
from the right to counsel mentioned in the Miranda warnings. This second right-to-counsel issue involves the
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counsel.99 This is not an obvious assumption, as a defendant who has already been
provided a lawyer and who is then informed again that a lawyer will be appointed
for him might be confused about the repetition.100 To understand that the warnings
cover both the Fifth and Sixth Amendment right to counsel and to comprehend
how that right applies in a second or subsequent interrogation requires a sophisticated level of constitutional understanding.101 Nevertheless, under Montejo, a
defendant must still assert his right to counsel under Miranda or consider it
waived.102 Again, the predicate foundation for invocation or waiver is an understanding of the rights in the first place.103
Finally, the Court in Florida v. Powell addressed the substance of the warnings
provided, recognizing that a suspect must understand the four core legal principles
built within the Miranda decision.104 In Powell, the Court had no reason to address
the predicate issue of understanding, because it was conceded that if accurate and
complete, the warnings provided to Powell had been understood.105
2. Explaining Miranda: Reasonably Conveying Miranda’s Essential Message
In order to be “understood,” Miranda rights must be explained to suspects by
law enforcement officers. Powell clarified that the Supreme Court was willing to
take a more flexible approach in explaining the core self-incrimination concepts.106 The Court held that so long as the substance of the warnings is reasonably
conveyed to the suspect, there is no magic formulation for the words spoken.107
“The four warnings Miranda requires are invariable, but this Court has not dictated
the words in which the essential information must be conveyed.”108
In Powell, the question before the Court was whether a warning that informed
the suspect that he had the right to talk to a lawyer before answering any questions,
and the right to use any of his rights at any time he wanted during the interview,109
was sufficient to apprise him that he could have a lawyer with him during

right to request a lawyer at the time of the interrogation, falling under the Fifth Amendment protection against
self-incrimination. See Eda Katharine Tinto, Wavering on Waiver, Montejo v. Louisiana and the Sixth Amendment
Right to Counsel, 48 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1335, 1338–42 (2011).
99. See Montejo, 556 U.S. at 798.
100. Id. at 812–14 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
101. For example, a defendant who has not confessed, but has been appointed a lawyer, might be somewhat
puzzled when interrogating officers inform him that a lawyer will be appointed for him. Id.
102. Id. at 797.
103. Id. at 798 (remanding case to give Montejo a chance to show waiver was not knowing or voluntary).
104. 130 S. Ct. 1195, 1204 (2010).
105. Compare id. at 1205 n.7, with id. at 1212 n.10 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
106. See id. at 1204–05 (majority opinion).
107. See id. at 1204 (discussing the Miranda warning requirements).
108. Id.
109. See id. at 1199–1200 (providing the contents of the Miranda waiver form utilized by officers in the case).
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questioning.110 Powell argued that, as understood, the warning incorrectly limited
access to a lawyer only to the time before questioning.111
In rejecting that argument, the Supreme Court reasoned that “[i]n determining
whether police officers adequately conveyed the four warnings, we have said,
reviewing courts are not required to examine the words employed ‘as if construing
a will or defining the terms of an easement.’”112 Relying on Duckworth v. Eagan113
and California v. Prysock,114 the Court reasoned that “[t]he inquiry is simply
whether the warnings reasonably convey[ed] to a suspect his rights as required by
Miranda.”115
The Powell decision signifies a modification of traditional Miranda practice. It
shifts the focus from the proverbial “rights card” to the meaning of the rights
themselves, and it shifts from the precise words used to the essential “nature” of
the warnings. Both related points provide for a more informal and flexible
approach to the warnings.116 Both also reflect a move towards a contextual
understanding of the rights as relevant to the interrogation at issue. After all, if all
that matters are certain magic words uttered aloud, the Court could have required
those words, rather than focusing on the essential meaning of the rights as
conveyed to the suspect.
Powell responds to the reality that Miranda is explained differently across the
country.117 Despite its central place in criminal procedure, or perhaps because of it,
local jurisdictions have created different versions of the Miranda warnings.118 One
national study recognized that among federal, state, and local police districts there
were then over 500 various Miranda rights formulations.119 The warnings varied
between 49 words to 547 words.120 Further, the level of sophistication in the rights

110. Id. at 1203–04 (phrasing the question presented as whether the warnings Powell received satisfied the
requirement that defendants be “clearly informed that [they have] the right to consult with a lawyer and to have
the lawyer with [them] during interrogation”).
111. See id. 1200–01 (discussing the factual history of the case).
112. Id. at 1204 (quoting Duckworth v. Eagan, 492 U.S. 195, 203 (1989)).
113. 492 U.S. 195.
114. 453 U.S. 355, 359 (1981) (“This Court has never indicated that the ‘rigidity’ of Miranda extends to the
precise formulation of the warnings given a criminal defendant.”).
115. Powell, 130 S. Ct. at 1204 (quoting Duckworth, 492 U.S. at 203).
116. There is an interesting parallel in terms of flexibility of waiver analysis in the Berghuis case. See Berghuis
v. Thompkins, 130 S. Ct. 2250, 2262 (“Although Miranda imposes on the police a rule that is both formalistic and
practical when it prevents them from interrogating suspects without first providing them with a Miranda warning,
it does not impose a formalistic waiver procedure that a suspect must follow to relinquish those rights.” (citations
omitted)).
117. See Powell, 130 S. Ct. at 1206; Richard Rogers et al., The Language of Miranda Warnings in American
Jurisdictions: A Replication and Vocabulary Analysis, 32 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 124, 125 (2008) [hereinafter
Rogers et al., The Language of Miranda] (providing results of study detailing various Miranda warning
formulations).
118. See Rogers et al., The Language of Miranda, supra note 117, at 125.
119. See id.
120. See id.
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varied from a second-grade reading level to a post-graduate-level reading level.121
The Powell decision explicitly recognizes that the rights form need not track the
exact Miranda language so long as the essential meaning of the rights is
reasonably conveyed.122 As the Court stated in comparing the Federal Bureau of
Investigation’s standard warnings to the ones used in Powell, “Different words
were used in the advice Powell received, but they communicated the same
essential message.”123 The new test will be whether the essential message of
Miranda was provided to the suspect prior to the interrogation. Such meaning must
provide enough information to allow a suspect to make a knowing and intelligent
decision about his or her rights.124 As will be explained, this focus on the essential
meanings also opens up a space for police officers to explain the rights in ordinary,
less formal language.
3. Speaking Miranda: Invitation to Dialogue
The third point to distill from the Supreme Court’s recent Miranda decisions
involves the rules for invoking one’s constitutional rights to a lawyer or to silence.
While it can be argued that the Supreme Court merely refined the procedures by
which warnings are given to suspects in Powell, the Court significantly redefined
the law on invocation in Berghuis. In an impassioned dissent, Justice Sotomayor
recognized the significant shift of responsibilities required by Berghuis: “Today’s
decision turns Miranda upside down. Criminal suspects must now unambiguously
invoke their right to remain silent, which counterintuitively, requires them to
speak.”125 To invoke the right to silence, a defendant must communicate that wish
to police officers in a clear, unambiguous manner.126
This requirement to speak now parallels the requirement to invoke one’s Sixth
Amendment right to counsel established by Davis v. United States.127 In Davis, the
Court held that a “suspect must unambiguously request counsel.”128 There now

121. Id. For example, in the Powell case, the Tampa police had utilized a form that seemingly provided an
incomplete list of Miranda rights, leaving out the information that informed the suspect that a lawyer could be
with him during questioning. See Powell, 130 S. Ct. at 1200–01.
122. Powell, 130 S. Ct. at 1204–05.
123. Id. at 1206.
124. See Berghuis v. Thompkins, 130 S. Ct. 2250, 2260 (2010) (reaffirming that a knowing and intelligent
waiver is required before statement obtained during custodial interrogation is admitted at trial).
125. Id. at 2278 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
126. See id. at 2260 (majority opinion).
127. See 512 U.S. 452 (1994).
128. Id. at 459. This affirmative request requirement is consistent with the Court’s holdings in Montejo v.
Louisiana and Maryland v. Shatzer in which the Court stated that a defendant must reassert his or her right to
counsel, even after the Sixth Amendment right to counsel has attached. See Shatzer, 130 S. Ct. 1213, 1223 (2010)
(implementing a fourteen-day break in custody rule after which police may reinitialize custodial interrogation
despite an initial request for counsel); Montejo, 556 U.S. 778, 789 (2009).
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exists a rough symmetry—in order for a right to be honored the defendant must
unambiguously invoke it.129
This shift also reaffirms the importance of distinguishing between a factual
understanding (I understand the words you are speaking) and a contextual
understanding (I understand what those words mean in this situation) of constitutional rights. In order to speak up and ask for a right to be honored, one must
understand the relevance of that right in the circumstances presented. Compare, for
example, the difference between passively acknowledging that Miranda rights
have been read out loud, and actively asserting a request to take advantage of one
of those rights (I want a lawyer). In the latter circumstance, you must understand
that the request will result in actions by the interrogating officers (I will get a
lawyer). This is the core meaning of “intelligently” waiving the right—meaning
choosing between equally clear alternatives.130
Speaking up to assert one’s rights provides an opportunity for communication
between suspect and officer about the meaning of those rights.131 Communication
is not a wholly new concept in the Miranda cases. Concurring in Davis, four
Justices in 1994 expressed support for a “clarification approach”132 whereby
ambiguous requests for a lawyer would spark a conversation to clarify what the
suspect meant by a reference to a lawyer.133 Such recognition of communication in
the guise of clarification also has support in Duckworth v. Eagan,134 where the
court presumed that if uncertain about a right, the defendant will ask for
clarification: “We think it must be relatively commonplace for a suspect, after
receiving Miranda warnings, to ask when he will obtain counsel.”135 Further, as
acknowledged by Justice Sotomayor in her Berghuis dissent, police can always ask
for clarification of an answer.136 A dialogue approach would merely shift the topic
of conversation from whether a suspect wants a lawyer to whether a suspect
actually understands what the right to a lawyer means.

129. Oddly, there is no corresponding rule that the officers inform suspects that all responses must be
unambiguous. One student in my criminal procedure class provided the rather elegant solution to the problem of
ambiguity by proposing that the Supreme Court amend the Miranda requirements to actually spell out what was
requested of the suspect. In short, if the Court wants an unambiguous invocation, they should ask for an
unambiguous invocation in the Miranda warnings.
130. See Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 421 (1986) (requiring that a waiver must be “the product of a free
and deliberate choice . . . made with a full awareness of both the nature of the right being abandoned and the
consequences of the decision to abandon it”); United States v. Garibay, 143 F.3d 534, 537–40 (9th Cir. 1998)
(considering language issues in determining whether defendant knowingly and intelligently waived his Miranda
rights); United States v. Short, 790 F.2d 464, 469 (6th Cir. 1986) (same).
131. While technically arising in the “invocation” analysis of the Court’s opinion, it informs how the “waiver”
analysis should be understood. See Berghuis, 130 S. Ct. at 2260.
132. Davis, 512 U.S. at 474 (Souter, J., concurring).
133. Id. at 476.
134. 492 U.S. 195, 204 (1989).
135. Id.
136. Berghuis, 130 S. Ct. at 2276 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (“It is hardly an unreasonable burden for police to
ask a suspect, for instance, ‘Do you want to talk to us?’”).
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Plainly, a requirement to invoke Miranda rights does not necessarily require a
conversation between the suspect and interrogating officers. To invoke does not
mean to converse. However, in requiring the suspect affirmatively to speak, a shift
has taken place. The question that centers this Article is: why, if you are going to
require a suspect to speak about those rights, do you not also require a suspect to
assure you that the suspect actually understands those rights? There are strong
arguments on either side, which is the subject of Part III.
B. Weaving the Threads Together
Analyzing these three Miranda principles—(1) emphasizing a full understanding of rights, (2) allowing flexibility in the advisement of rights, and (3) requiring
affirmative invocation—creates the opportunity to look anew at the problem of
disputed Miranda waivers. Prior to the Supreme Court’s decisions in 2009 and
2010, it would have been quite controversial to assert that in the face of a right to
silence the suspect should speak with officers, just as it would have been
controversial to assert that interrogating officers need only to “reasonably convey”
the rights written on the rights form. Today, the law allows but does not command
an alternative path that encourages a defendant to speak about his or her rights, as
well as an officer to explain the essential meaning of those rights.
II. SCIENTIFIC UNDERSTANDING OF MIRANDA WAIVER:
CONSENSUS-BASED UNDERSTANDING
At approximately the same time the Supreme Court began its most recent
reconsideration of Miranda doctrine, experts in the science of interviewing and
interrogation, including clinical psychologists, experimental psychologists, and
criminologists,137 published a “consensus-based statement on confessions.”138
This “White Paper,” entitled Police-Induced Confessions: Risk Factors and
Recommendations, was produced as part of the American Psychology-Law Society Scientific Review Paper series sponsored by the American Psychological
Association.139 Written by internationally recognized scholars, and subjected to
scientific peer review, the document serves as an authoritative distillation of the
scientific scholarship on confessions.140 The purpose of the White Paper was to
identify the characteristics and factors that surround the voluntariness and reliabil-

137. Kassin et al., White Paper, supra note 29, at 4 (attempting to review the “state of the science on
interviewing and interrogation” by bringing together scholars and experts involved in the fields of clinical
psychology, experimental psychology, and criminology).
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Traditionally a “white paper” is “a government report on any subject; especially an English publication.”
WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY (1993). In scientific disciplines it represents the consensus
opinion of experts in a particular field.
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ity of confessions,141 as well as to make policy recommendations to reduce
“police-induced” false confessions.142 Necessarily, the drafters of the White Paper
studied Miranda waivers and issues surrounding Miranda comprehension.143 The
White Paper reflects a growing scientific understanding of brain science144 and
forensic science145 about problems with Miranda waivers, especially involving
vulnerable suspects such as people with intellectual disabilities, mental illness, and
juveniles.146
The White Paper addressed the practice of Miranda waivers prior to the
Supreme Court’s recent decisions. Yet the consensus of the scientific community
speaks clearly to the problems with the current Miranda practice and the need for a
new approach. This Part evaluates the state of factual, legal, and scientific
understanding of Miranda waivers of vulnerable suspects, as well as the conclusions of the White Paper study. The White Paper echoes the Supreme Court’s
emphasis that a knowing and intelligent understanding is central to any valid
waiver.147 It reiterates the special concern that vulnerable persons have in adequately comprehending Miranda and the constitutional rights they are waiving.148 As will be discussed, however, many of the scientific conclusions are at
odds with current police practice and have yet to affect Supreme Court decisions.
The analysis below exposes a significant weakness in current legal doctrine, which
reflects the need for a new approach.

141. Kassin et al., White Paper, supra note 29, at 4.
142. See GRISSO, EVALUATING COMPETENCIES, supra note 5, at 150; Kassin et al., White Paper, supra note 29, at
4, 9 (“In a formal sense, whether one waives his or her rights voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently does not
have a direct bearing on the likelihood of false confessions. The decision to waive one’s rights in a police
interrogation does not necessarily lead to a confession, much less a false confession.” (citations omitted)).
143. See Kassin et al., White Paper, supra note 29, at 4, 7–9 (discussing drafters’ research).
144. See, e.g., Richard E. Redding, The Brain-Disordered Defendant: Neuroscience and Legal Insanity in the
Twenty-First Century, 56 AM. U. L. REV. 51, 62–63 (2006) (exploring brain-imaging studies on criminal
responsibility).
145. See Kirk Heilbrun & Stephanie Brooks, Forensic Psychology and Forensic Science: A Proposed Agenda
for the Next Decade, 16 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 219, 231 (2010).
146. See Kassin et al., White Paper, supra note 29, at 19 (“In any discussion of dispositional risk factors for
false confession, the two most commonly cited concerns are a suspect’s age (i.e., juvenile status) and mental
impairment (i.e., mental illness, mental retardation). These common citations are because of the staggering
overrepresentation of these groups in the population of proven false confessions. For example, of the first 200
DNA exonerations in the U.S., 35% of the false confessors were 18 years or younger and/or had a developmental
disability. In their sample of wrongful convictions, Gross, Jacoby, Matheson, Montgomery, and Patel (2005)
found that 44% of the exonerated juveniles and 69% of exonerated persons with mental disabilities were wrongly
convicted because of false confessions.”); see also Brandon L. Garrett, The Substance of False Confessions, 62
STAN. L. REV. 1051, 1092–94 (2010).
147. See Kassin et al.,White Paper, supra note 29, at 7 (discussing the importance that a waiver be knowing
and intelligent).
148. See id. at 8.
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A. Knowing Understanding of Miranda Waiver
From available studies, the consensus is that four out of five suspects waive their
Miranda rights.149 This figure is consistent over several different studies and over
different time periods.150 In raw numbers, approximately 318,000 defendants a
year waive constitutional rights under police interrogation.151 A defendant’s
waiver of Miranda rights is a reality that Miranda itself contemplated.152 Obviously, the purpose of reading the Miranda warnings is to provide a defendant the
knowledge and understanding from which to make a choice about whether to
invoke or waive his or her rights.153
The White Paper’s drafters concluded that under non-stressful, controlled
environments, most adults with average intellectual functioning “exhibit a reasonably good understanding of their rights.”154 “Reasonably good,” however, may
still result in a troubling factual misunderstanding of rights. Prior studies had
shown that twenty-three percent of adults do not understand at least one of the
rights in the written waiver form.155 This lack of complete comprehension covers
both people with prior criminal experience and those without criminal involvement. For example, one study showed that forty-three percent of adult offenders
and seventy percent of adult non-offenders156 misunderstand the right to silence in

149. Saul M. Kassin et al., Police Interviewing and Interrogation: A Self-Report Survey of Police Practices
and Beliefs, 31 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 381, 383 (2007) [hereinafter Kassin et al., Police Interviewing] (citing
studies); see id. at 394 (“Research suggests that roughly four out of five people waive their rights. In our survey,
participants’ self-reported experiences were highly consistent with this finding . . . .”).
150. See, e.g., Frumkin, Psychological Evaluation, supra note 9, at 135; Cloud et al., supra note 17, at 497 n.11
(citing studies that show between seventy-five and eighty percent of suspects waive their Miranda rights);
Richard A. Leo, Inside the Interrogation Room, 86 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 266, 276 tb1.3 (1996); Alan C.
Michaels, Rights Knowledge: Values and Tradeoffs, 39 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 1355, 1364–65 (2007) (“Indeed, while
the empirical evidence is certainly limited, the weight of the evidence is that Miranda’s effects on overall
outcomes is ‘vanishingly small.’ In many cases, but of course not all, in which police seek a statement, suspects
waive their Miranda rights.”).
151. Rogers et al., Everybody Knows, supra note 39, at 302.
152. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966) (discussing a defendant’s possible waiver of rights).
153. See Cloud et al., supra note 17, at 499 (“Miranda conceptualized suspects as rational decision makers
who possessed the cognitive tools necessary to implement the warnings. The Court assumed that suspects would
understand both the meaning and the legal significance of the warnings. Unless a suspect understands the
warnings, they are but meaningless sounds. And no group is less likely to understand the warnings than is the large
minority of suspects who are mentally retarded.” (internal citations omitted)); Richard Rogers et al., Development
and Initial Validation of the Miranda Vocabulary Scale, 33 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 381, 390 (2009) [hereinafter
Rogers et al., Vocabulary Scale] (“A lack of comprehension of key Miranda terminology is likely to compromise
a suspect’s ability to make a rational waiver. The effects of impaired vocabulary can be considered from two
interrelated perspectives. First, does the inability to understand a specific term affect Miranda understanding? For
instance, a suspect provided an oral warning may misapprehend the word ‘waive’ as a ‘friendly gesture’ or a
‘positive sign’ and not understand its import to the waiver decision. Second, does the overall Miranda-relevant
vocabulary collectively affect Miranda understanding?”).
154. Kassin et al., White Paper, supra note 29, at 7.
155. Frumkin, Psychological Evaluation, supra note 9, at 148.
156. Here, defined as people without a criminal history.
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court.157 Similarly, twenty-one percent of adult offenders and thirty-five percent of
adult non-offenders do not understand the right to silence in an interrogation.158
These misunderstandings focus on each of the component parts of waiver:
warning,159 silence,160 counsel,161 free representation,162 and continuing legal
rights.163 These research findings are confirmed by practical observations and
anecdotal data.164
Yet, while one can debate what is good enough for adults with average
functioning, the White Paper makes clear that certain groups cannot even grasp a
factual understanding of the Miranda protections.165 Specifically, juveniles under
sixteen years old and individuals with serious psychological disorders exhibit
“substantial impairments in understanding Miranda warnings compared to nonimpaired adult defendants.”166 As will be discussed in detail later, this means that
merely providing a factual statement of Miranda rights does not mean that
vulnerable suspects can be said to have a “knowing” understanding of their rights.
B. Intelligent Understanding of Miranda Waiver
A similar conclusion can be demonstrated in addressing whether a waiver was
“intelligent.” One of the conclusions of the White Paper is that some individuals,
who have an adequate factual understanding of Miranda to satisfy the “knowing”
element of the legal test, may not “grasp [Miranda’s] relevance to the situation
they are in.”167 As the White Paper states, “[e]ven among those with adequate
understanding, suspects will vary in their capacities to ‘think’ and ‘decide’ about

157. Id. at 148 (citing Grisso studies).
158. Id.
159. Rogers et al., Everybody Knows, supra note 39, at 305.
160. See id. at 303 (“Without specifically being told, many defendants misinterpret the word ‘right’ as a choice
or something correct rather than a Constitutional protection. Believing that both choices (talking or silence) are
likely to be incriminating, defendants may opt to waive their rights—reasoning that it is better to talk than to be
convicted with silence.” (citation omitted)).
161. Id. at 303–04.
162. Id. at 304.
163. Id.
164. See, e.g., Richard Rogers et al., Knowing and Intelligent: A Study of Miranda Warnings in Mentally
Disordered Defendants, 31 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 401, 402 (2007) [hereinafter Rogers et al., Knowing and
Intelligent] (“In a survey of criminal defendants they had represented, defense counsel estimated that 48.4% did
not understand the basics of Miranda at the time they confessed or made important admissions to law
enforcement.”).
165. See Kassin et al., White Paper, supra note 29, at 8 (explaining that adults with mental disorders and
adolescents below age sixteen have an impaired understanding of the Miranda warnings).
166. Id.
167. Id. (“For example, one may factually understand that ‘I can have an attorney before and during
questioning’ yet not know what an attorney is or what role an attorney would play. Others may understand the
attorney’s role but disbelieve that it would apply in their own situation—as when youth cannot imagine that an
adult would take their side against other adults, or when a person with paranoid tendencies believes that any
attorney, even his own, would oppose him.”).
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waiving their rights.”168 While primarily a concern with vulnerable populations,
the recognition of the difference between “knowledge of Miranda rights” and
“appreciation of Miranda rights” offers a significant lesson to courts.
For example, as has been recognized by several prior studies, most people can
recognize the Miranda warnings.169 One survey showed in tests gauging whether
individuals could identify rights through a series of yes/no questions, that “most
persons recognized that suspects have the right to remain silent (81%), the right to
counsel (95%), and the right to indigent-based free legal services (88%).”170 Yet,
studies showed that individuals did not fully understand their rights in application
to their current situation.171 This is why merely reading the rights, or having a
suspect read the rights to himself, might not adequately establish an intelligent
understanding of the rights. A second step is needed to assess whether an
individual understands the concepts as they apply to his or her situation.
The distinction between “knowing” and “intelligent” can be characterized as the
difference between “knowledge” and “working knowledge,” meaning the ability
to incorporate working memory, future reasoning, abstract reasoning, and contextual awareness in the decision.172 Miranda warnings provide a choice, but a choice
based on misunderstanding the options is not an “intelligent” choice.173 As one
study comparing pretrial defendants’ and college students’ understanding of
Miranda concluded, “the current findings suggest most persons can recognize their
basic rights to silence and legal counsel. However, the more critical question is
whether they have an accurate working knowledge of their rights.”174 The studies

168. Id.
169. See Rogers et al., Everybody Knows, supra note 39, at 301–02.
170. Id. at 302 (“Interpretation of these findings should be tempered, however, by the fact that this survey did
not require participants to identify suspect’s rights, but rather to answer yes-no questions gauging the ability to
simply recognize such rights.” (emphasis in original)). But see id. (“From a contrasting perspective, studies
conducted in Virginia found that close to 90% of police chiefs either agreed or strongly agreed with the notion that
members of the general public are misguided in their perceptions of Miranda warnings, although more than 80%
of these police chiefs did believe that most offenders already knew their Miranda rights.” (citations omitted)).
171. See id. at 304 (explaining that defendants may know they can talk to counsel but may not know that the
services are free).
172. See id. at 314 (explaining that there is a difference between “what the public believes it knows and what it
actually knows” about Miranda).
173. See Barry C. Feld, Juveniles’ Competence to Exercise Miranda Rights: An Empirical Study of Policy and
Practice, 91 MINN. L. REV. 26, 43 (2006) (“Although the Miranda process focuses primarily on factual
understanding of the words of the warning, a waiver of rights also involves the ability to make rational decisions
and to appreciate the consequences of relinquishing them. Simply understanding the abstract words of a Miranda
warning may not enable a person to exercise the rights effectively.”); Kimberly Larson, Improving the “Kangaroo
Courts”: A Proposal for Reform in Evaluating Juveniles’ Waiver of Miranda, 48 VILL. L. REV. 629, 650 (2003)
(explaining that while Miranda warnings advise people of options, “knowledge of these options is meaningless
without an understanding of their function”).
174. Rogers et al., Everybody Knows, supra note 39, at 314 (“For instance, do they understand that their right
to silence is constitutionally protected against self-incrimination? With 36.4% of college students and nearly as
many defendants (30.9%) erroneously concluding that silence is likely to incriminate, the idea of an accurate
working knowledge for most defendants is highly suspect.”).
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show that for all suspects, but particularly vulnerable suspects, “full awareness”175
must include an intelligent understanding as well as a mere factual understanding.176 “Intelligent waiver” means intelligent understanding for everyone but
particularly vulnerable populations.177
1. Vulnerable Populations
The White Paper, consistent with the weight of scientific research, demonstrates
that existing Miranda practice does not protect vulnerable populations. As the
authors concluded:
[R]esearch suggests that adults with mental disabilities,178 as well as adolescents,179 are particularly at risk when it comes to understanding the meaning of
Miranda warnings. In addition, they often lack the capacity to weigh the
consequences of rights waiver, and are more susceptible to waiving their rights
as a matter of mere compliance with authority.180

As recognized, within the group of vulnerable defendants that waive but do not
fully understand their rights, three groups stand out for special consideration.181
These vulnerable populations consist of: (1) individuals who are developmentally
disabled182 (including those diagnosed as intellectually disabled or suffering from
other cognitive limitations);183 (2) individuals with serious, distorting mental

175. See Fulero & Everington, supra note 4, at 54–55 (stating that individuals must have full awareness of
“both the nature of the right being abandoned and the consequences of the decision to abandon it”).
176. Cf. Grisso, supra note 5, at 1153 (finding that 63.3% of children misunderstood at least one word
necessary to understand the Miranda warnings).
177. See Fulero & Everington, supra note 4, at 55 (“In evaluating the validity of a waiver, two things should be
considered: (a) the defendant’s ability to understand the warnings and (b) the manner in which the rights were
given. The validity of waivers entered by persons with mental retardation is suspect in regard to both
understanding and voluntariness. First, due to limited cognitive and linguistic abilities of persons with mental
retardation, most lack a complete understanding of the Miranda warning and, thus, may not realize that a waiver
of rights involves possible self-incrimination.” (footnotes omitted)).
178. Kassin et al., White Paper, supra note 29, at 8–9 (identifying studies which found that adults with
psychological disorders and mental retardation have “substantial impairments in understanding of Miranda
warnings”).
179. Id. (discussing studies showing that adolescents are more likely to not understand Miranda warnings).
180. Id. at 9 (“Suggestibility refers to a predisposition to accept information communicated by others and to
incorporate that information into one’s beliefs and memories. In general, these studies indicate that persons with
mental retardation and adolescents in general are more susceptible to suggestion in the context of making
hypothetical waiver decisions, and that greater suggestibility is related to poorer comprehension of the
warnings.”).
181. Id. at 8.
182. See Cloud et al., supra note 17, at 499–501 (discussing individuals who are developmentally disabled).
183. See GRISSO, EVALUATING COMPETENCIES, supra note 5, at 150, 157 (explaining that the possibility of
invalidating an adult defendant’s waiver has been raised for “individuals with significant intellectual deficits”);
Cloud et al., supra note 17, at 508 (“[C]ognitive and social limitations make mentally retarded people more
vulnerable to a wide range of dangers, including confessing to crimes they have not committed.”).
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illness;184 and (3) juveniles.185 A wealth of research has been uncovered by
scientific and legal scholars confirming that these particular vulnerable populations may not be able to adequately understand and appreciate Miranda warnings
under the current practice.186 Worse yet, many of the waivers from these populations are never challenged in court.187
2. Intellectual Disability
Individuals with developmental disabilities including an intellectual disability188 (mental retardation),189 low cognitive functioning,190 organic brain damage,
or traumatic brain injury are particularly vulnerable in Miranda waiver situations.191 This is not a small population, as some estimates have determined that
there are approximately 200,000 intellectually disabled people imprisoned in the
United States.192
Studies have shown that persons with an intellectual disability are less likely to
understand their Miranda rights.193 In controlled studies, researchers observed a

184. See Kassin et al., White Paper, supra note 29, at 8 (explaining that studies of individuals with serious
psychological disorders have found substantial impairments in understanding Miranda warnings when compared
to non-impaired adults).
185. See GRISSO, EVALUATING COMPETENCIES, supra note 5, at 150 (“[M]any courts have dealt with questions of
the capacities of juveniles to validly waive rights to silence and counsel, noting that their relative immaturity
suggests greater vulnerability and potentially diminished cognitive capacities to understand their rights.”
(citations omitted)); see also Tamar R. Birckhead, The Age of the Child: Interrogating Juveniles After Roper v.
Simmons, 65 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 385, 413 (2008) (recognizing the vulnerability of juveniles in the context of
interrogation).
186. See Kassin et al., White Paper, supra note 29, at 8–9 (explaining that adults with mental disorders and
adolescents are at risk for not understanding Miranda warnings).
187. Cf. Rogers et al., Everybody Knows, supra note 39, at 302 (“In an informal questioning of more than 100
public defenders, Rogers found none acknowledged having raised Miranda issues—even for initial investigation—
while defending more than 22,000 felony cases in the last 12 months.”).
188. See Robert L. Schalock et al., The Renaming of Mental Retardation: Understanding the Change to the
Term Intellectual Disability, 45 INTELL. & DEV. DISABILITIES 116 (2007) (discussing the use of the term
“intellectual disability” as compared to “mental retardation”). Throughout this Article, I attempt to use the term
“intellectual disability,” except for where the sources themselves use the term “mental retardation.”
189. See Cloud et al., supra note 17, at 509 (“Mental retardation is defined as significantly subaverage general
intellectual functioning that is accompanied by significant limitations in adaptive functioning and an onset during
the early developmental period. General intellectual functioning is measured by IQ, with ‘significantly subaverage’ (the standard for mental retardation) set at an IQ of 70 or below.” (footnotes omitted)).
190. See Diane Courselle et al., Suspects, Defendants, and Offenders with Mental Retardation in Wyoming, 1
WYO. L. REV. 1, 9 (2001) (discussing low cognitive functioning).
191. See LAWRENCE M. SOLAN & PETER M. TIERMSA, SPEAKING OF CRIME: THE LANGUAGE OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE
78 (William O’Barr & John M. Conley eds., 2005) (“[P]eople with mental retardation do not typically understand
their Miranda rights at anything approaching an acceptable level.”); Cloud et al., supra note 17, at 499 (explaining
that mental retardation makes some people incapable of understanding Miranda warnings and the consequences
of not following them).
192. See Cloud et al., supra note 17, at 504 (citing studies, some of which refer to the intellectually disabled as
mentally retarded).
193. See Fulero & Everington, supra note 4, at 55–56 (“[D]ue to limited cognitive and linguistic abilities of
persons with mental retardation, most lack a complete understanding of the Miranda warning and, thus, may not
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marked difference between the individuals with an intellectual disability and those
without.194 As the authors of a 2002 study concluded:
The results indicate that mentally retarded people simply do not understand the
Miranda warnings. Virtually all of the disabled subjects failed to understand
the context in which interrogation occurs, the legal consequences embedded in
the rules or the significance of confessing, the meaning of the sentences that
comprise the warnings, or even the individual operative words used to
construct the warnings. In contrast, comparably large percentages of the
nondisabled control group did understand the individual words, the complete
warnings, and their legal significance.195

Whether designated as a “mild,”196 “moderate,”197 or “severe”198 form of
mental retardation, the effect of the impairment was sufficient to undermine an
understanding of Miranda.199 The studies showed that even individuals with
developmental disabilities with IQs above those typically considered an intellectual disability failed to understand the warnings.200 This latter point means that
“many people with below-average IQs, but not low enough to qualify as retarded,
do not understand the warnings.”201 Other studies have confirmed these results202

realize that a waiver of rights involves possible self-incrimination.”); see also Follette et al., supra note 4, at 45
(“The limited cognitive abilities, vocabularies, and general knowledge of those with mental retardation result in
poorer understanding of the linguistic meaning of the rights as commonly administered, as well as of the risks of
self-incrimination and other consequences of waiving these rights. For example, in two studies, 90 percent and 68
percent of adults with mental retardation received scores of zero on one or more tests of relevant vocabulary,
understanding of the Miranda warnings, and understanding of the function of rights in interrogation (which was
most poorly understood of all).” (citation omitted)).
194. Kassin et al., White Paper, supra note 29, at 21 (“Across four studies of Miranda comprehension, findings
are quite consistent in showing that persons with mental retardation have significant deficits in their understanding
and appreciation of Miranda warnings (Cloud, Shepard, Barkoff, & Shur, 2002; Everington & Fulero, 1999;
Fulero & Everington, 1995; O’Connell, Garmoe, & Goldstein, 2005). For example, O’Connell et al. (2005) found
that 50% of people with mild mental retardation in their sample could not correctly paraphrase any of the five
Miranda components (see also Everington & Fulero, 1999). In comparison, less than 1% of adults in the general
population score similarly low (Grisso, 1996).”).
195. Cloud et al., supra note 17, at 501.
196. Id. at 510 (stating that mild retardation roughly equates to IQ scores between fifty/fifty-five and seventy).
197. Id. (stating that moderate retardation roughly equates to IQ scores between thirty-five/forty and
fifty/fifty-five).
198. Id. (stating that severe retardation roughly equates to IQ scores ranging between twenty/twenty-five and
thirty-five/forty).
199. Id. at 501.
200. See id. (detailing results of studies).
201. Id. at 539.
202. See, e.g., Cloud et al., supra note 17, at 499 (concluding from an empirical study that “mental retardation
makes some people incapable of understanding either the text of the Miranda rights or the consequences of
forsaking them” (footnotes omitted)); Fulero & Everington, supra note 4, at 59 (“The available research indicates
that persons with mental retardation have significant problems in comprehension of this warning. To date, three
studies have investigated persons with mental retardation’s understanding of the Miranda warnings: Fulero &
Everington, 1995; Everington & Fulero, 1999; Cloud, Shepherd, Barkoff, & Shur, 2002.”); id. at 60 (“[P]ersons
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in rather emphatic terms.203
Beyond comprehension, studies have shown that intellectually disabled suspects are more likely to waive their rights.204 Intellectually disabled suspects are
more susceptible to interrogation techniques such as “maximization”205 (statements such as “if you do not waive now, you will get the death penalty”) and
“minimization”206 (statements such as “I just need to go over some formalities”)
such that they misapprehend the purpose of the warnings.207 They are also more
suggestible to overt requests to waive rights.208 The situational stressors of
custodial interrogation have a negative effect on Miranda comprehension for this
population.209 The real world pressure of questioning undermines full aware-

with mental retardation have unusual difficulty with comprehension of the Miranda warnings that are designed to
protect suspects.”).
203. See Cloud et al., supra note 17, at 538 (“[T]he mentally retarded subjects simply did not understand the
Miranda warnings. On each of the three tests, the disabled subjects’ scores indicate that, regardless of the level of
disability, they did not understand all of the important principles contained in the Miranda warnings. The data
show that these mentally retarded subjects possessed insufficient understanding to execute valid waivers of their
Miranda rights.”).
204. See Fulero & Everington, supra note 4, at 56–57 (explaining the studied phenomenon that mentally
retarded individuals are more likely to mask their ignorance, acquiesce to authority figures, and please others
including the questioners); see also Cloud et al., supra note 17, at 511–13 (explaining seven factors that make
mentally retarded individuals poorly equipped for interrogation and more likely to falsely confess); Courselle et
al., supra note 190, at 64–65 (“Given the structure of Miranda warnings used by most police officers, suspects
with mental retardation are particularly susceptible to ‘waiving’ their Miranda rights regardless of whether they
truly understand them.”).
205. “In maximization, the interrogator uses scare tactics to intimidate the subject.” Fulero & Everington,
supra note 4, at 58.
206. One example of “minimization” would be when “the interrogator minimizes the importance by presenting
the signed waiver as a formality.” Id.
207. See id. (explaining that people with mental retardation have a hard time deciphering people’s motives in
giving warnings and then acting on those warnings).
208. Kassin et al., White Paper, supra note 29, at 9. To be precise, it must be noted that the connection between
suggestibility in confessions and Miranda waiver is not definitively accepted. Compare Richard Rogers et al., The
Role of Suggestibility in Determinations of Miranda Abilities: A Study of the Gudjonsson Suggestibility Scales, 34
LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 66, 76 (2010) [hereinafter Rogers et al., Gudjonsson Suggestibility Scales] (“[H]igh levels of
suggestibility appear to play no direct role for diminished abilities in Miranda comprehension and reasoning.”),
and Gisli H. Gudjonsson, Compliance in an Interrogative Situation: A New Scale, 10 PERSONALITY & INDIVIDUAL
DIFFERENCES 535, 538 (1989) (explaining that IQ does not correlate significantly with the compliance score), with
Courselle et al., supra note 190, at 64–65 (“At the point of arrest, persons with mental retardation can be easily
intimidated by authority figures such as police officers. They may attempt to appear more competent than they are
by stating that they understand their Miranda rights . . . . Because many persons with mental retardation are eager
to please others and have a response bias toward acquiescence, the likely answer of a suspect with mental
retardation to each of the Miranda questions will be ‘yes.’”).
209. See Fulero & Everington, supra note 4, at 58 (describing a typical interrogation in the following way:
“Using low-key, sotto voce statements, the detective tries to lead the suspect into thinking all this is just a
formality before getting down to the real business at hand. Being trained to please good authority figures, persons
with mental retardation often catch the officer’s wooing, low-key tone of voice. They trust him. They initial and
sign the sheet. They do it although they do not have a clue as to what can happen to them after that.” (footnote
omitted)).

1462

AMERICAN CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 49:1437

ness210 and can also lead to false confessions.211 The clear and uncontested
conclusion is that suspects who are developmentally cognitively impaired are
vulnerable to unknowing and especially unintelligent Miranda waivers.
3. Mental Illness
Separate from developmental disabilities, individuals with certain psychological disorders also suffer greater vulnerability in Miranda waiver situations.212
While less clear-cut than with an intellectual disability, the White Paper and other
studies have shown that serious mental illness can distort and impede full
understanding of Miranda rights.213 This can manifest itself in impaired understanding,214 as well as certain forms of anxiety or other phobias which can distort the
decision-making process.215 Again, this subset of vulnerable persons is significant
in number.216 Some estimates have concluded that each year approximately
695,000 persons with mental disorders enter the criminal justice system,217 thus
affecting hundreds of thousands of Miranda situations. While the scientific
evidence is not settled on the effect of mental illness (due to the large number of
mental diseases and variables),218 some studies have shown that mental illness
210. See Follette et al., supra note 4, at 45 (explaining that mentally retarded individuals are likely to be
compliant and likely to help detectives who express a need).
211. See Kassin et al., White Paper, supra note 29, at 30 (“There is a strong consensus among psychologists,
legal scholars, and practitioners that juveniles and individuals with cognitive impairments or psychological
disorders are particularly susceptible to false confession under pressure.”).
212. See, e.g., Cooper & Zapf, supra note 4, at 392 (“[T]he presence of mental illness or a psychotic condition
has been cited as a factor to consider when determining a defendant’s capacity to waive his or her rights.”
(citations omitted)); Follette et al., supra note 4, at 44 (“Individuals with psychological difficulties can suffer
enhanced risk with regard to both susceptibility to coercion and failures of understanding.”).
213. See Kassin et al., White Paper, supra note 29, at 22 (explaining that most mentally disordered individuals
exhibited insufficient understanding of Miranda warnings).
214. Cf. Follette et al., supra note 4, at 45 (“Although research on the relationship of mental status to
comprehension has focused primarily on the young and the retarded, other mental disorders place the person at
enhanced risk for failures of comprehension and/or coercion.”).
215. See id. at 48 (“One would expect that persons with anxiety disorders would find the additional stress of an
interrogation extremely aversive and seek a quick end to the proceedings, even if it meant a poor distal
consequence. Generalized anxiety disorder, social phobia, panic disorder or specific phobias related to confinement or health-related concerns could hasten a false confession.”).
216. See Rogers et al., Everybody Knows, supra note 39, at 403 (“Weinstein, Kim, Mack, Malvade, and
Saraiya (2005) estimated their prevalence in correctional settings to range from 6 to 20%. A national survey of
jails by the Bureau of Justice Statistics (Ditton, 1999) estimated that 16% of inmates are diagnosed with Axis I
disorders. Focusing on specific disorders, Teplin (1994) randomly sampled 728 male jail detainees and found
3.0% currently diagnosed with schizophrenia and 4.1% with major mood disorders. Estimates are generally
higher among female jail detainees, especially for mood disorders (Lewis, 2005). With approximately 13.9
million arrests in 2004 (FBI, 2006), even a conservative estimate of 5.0% would suggest that 695,000 defendants
annually were suffering from severe mental disorders at the time of their arrests and subsequent Miranda
warnings.”).
217. Id.
218. See Kassin et al., White Paper, supra note 29, at 22 (“There is currently little research available to show
how different disorders (e.g., anxiety, depression, and schizophrenia) potentially impair the suspect’s capacity to
waive legal rights and navigate his or her way through a police interview (Redlich, 2004).”).
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significantly impairs Miranda warning comprehension.219
One study compared the ability of the lowest and highest functioning of
[mentally disordered] defendants to paraphrase Miranda warnings immediately after hearing them. While the lowest-functioning 25 percent had a
predictably dismal average comprehension rate of 24 percent of the warning,
even the highest-functioning 25 percent could only muster an average comprehension rate of 66 percent.220

Of course, due to the varying nature of mental illness including the type of
mental illness or severity, the impact can be greater221 or less222 than individuals
with other limitations. In general, however, mentally disordered defendants had
difficulty understanding the warnings,223 and those mental disorders had a negative effect on Miranda comprehension.224 The conclusion is that these suspects are
more vulnerable to unknowing or unintelligent waiver.
4. Juveniles
Study after study has shown that juveniles waive their rights more frequently
than adults and do not fully understand the substance or context of Miranda
warnings.225 While there are approximately 1.5 million juvenile offenders who
hear Miranda warnings every year,226 only 10% of juveniles exercise their
Miranda rights.227 Perhaps not surprisingly, the younger228 a child is the more

219. See Cooper & Zapf, supra note 4, at 392 (citing studies).
220. Richard Rogers et. al., Miranda Rights . . . and Wrongs: Myths, Methods, and Model Solutions, 22 A.B.A.
CRIM. JUST. 4, 4, 6 (2008) [hereinafter Rogers et al., Miranda Rights] (citing Richard Rogers et al., Knowing and
Intelligent, supra note 164, at 401–18).
221. See Cooper & Zapf, supra note 4, at 402 (“[P]sychiatric inpatients, on average, were more impaired than
both of Grisso’s adult samples and, in some domains, more impaired than Grisso’s juveniles. Although our
participants’ understanding was slightly better than previous research with mentally retarded persons, there was
still significant impairment in that three-fifths of our sample of psychiatric adults failed to understand at least one
Miranda right. However, a substantial proportion of participants were not impaired suggesting that mental illness
should not be equated with lack of capacity to understand or appreciate Miranda warnings.”).
222. See id. Also, it must be realized that in the study, the researchers only picked individuals committed for
mental illness and not so psychotic that they could not participate in the study. See id. In that sense it probably is a
conservative estimate of the effect.
223. See Rogers et al., Everybody Knows, supra note 39, at 414 (“A basic but crucial finding was that mentally
disordered defendants in the current study had widespread difficulties in understanding all but the simplest
warnings.”).
224. Id. at 408.
225. See Kassin et al., White Paper, supra note 29, at 8.
226. Richard Rogers et al., The Comprehensibility and Content of Juvenile Miranda Warnings, 14 PSYCHOL.
PUB. POL’Y & L. 63, 63 (2008) [hereinafter Rogers et al., Comprehensibility and Content].
227. Id. at 65 (“Overall, the striking rarity would seem to suggest that comparatively few adolescent suspects
make informed decisions, which take into account the potentially negative consequences of their choices.”).
228. See Feld, supra note 173, at 28; Larson, supra note 173, at 649–50 (citing the Grisso studies); Elizabeth
Cauffman et al., Justice for Juveniles: New Perspectives on Adolescents’ Competence and Culpability, 18
QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 403, 407 (1999) (citing Grisso studies for the proposition that “adolescents fifteen and older of
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likely he or she is to waive.229
Juveniles suffer several interrelated problems when trying to address the
decision of whether or not to waive constitutional rights. First, there exists the
basic question of simple comprehension. Testing has demonstrated that juveniles
do not understand Miranda.230 They do not understand the words and concepts in
the warnings.231 They do not understand the context or the significance of the
interrogation situation or potential court proceedings.232 Thomas Grisso’s foundational studies showed that only one out of five juveniles demonstrated an adequate
understanding of the four component parts of the Miranda warnings, and over half
of juveniles did not comprehend at least one of the warnings.233
In part, these difficulties can stem from problems with reading comprehension234 or oral comprehension deficiencies.235 Juveniles in the juvenile justice
system tend to function at a lower level of comprehension due to inadequate
schools, poverty, and developmental difficulties.236 Further, in an attempt to offer
more clarity, many juvenile waivers are longer and more complicated than adult

average intelligence were able to understand their Miranda rights as well as adults, but younger adolescents
performed more poorly.”).
229. See Rogers et al., Comprehensibility and Content, supra note 226, at 66 (analyzing studies showing that
younger children (those between ages eleven and fifteen) were more likely to waive than older children); see also
id. at 78 (“[M]ost juveniles ages 13 and younger are simply unlikely to grasp key Miranda components related to
their right to an attorney or parental assistance.”). The White Paper also cited several studies of Miranda
comprehension among juveniles with fairly consistent findings. Kassin et al., White Paper, supra note 29, at 8.
230. See, e.g., Kenneth J. King, Waiving Childhood Goodbye: How Juvenile Courts Fail to Protect Children
from Unknowing, Unintelligent, and Involuntary Waivers of Miranda Rights, 2006 WIS. L. REV. 431, 434–44
(discussing juveniles’ failure to comprehend Miranda warnings); Ellen Marrus, Can I Talk Now?: Why Miranda
Does Not Offer Adolescents Adequate Protections, 79 TEMP. L. REV. 515, 525–26 (2006) (same); Warren
Swymeler & Lynn S. Urban, Issues in Juvenile Justice: Rights Waivers and Trial Competency, 2007 J. INST. JUST.
& INT’L STUD. 323, 326 (examining studies of juveniles’ Miranda comprehension).
231. Compare Rogers et al., Comprehensibility and Content, supra note 226, at 75 (“The most obvious and
far-reaching conclusion from the current data is that typical juvenile Miranda warnings are far beyond the abilities
of the more than 115,000 preteen offenders charged annually with criminal offenses.”), with 18 U.S.C. § 5033
(2006) (requiring under the Federal Delinquency Act that a juvenile in federal custody be informed in language
comprehensible to the juvenile).
232. THOMAS GRISSO, JUVENILES’ WAIVER OF RIGHTS: LEGAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL COMPETENCE 89–90 (1981);
Feld, supra note 173, at 89 (“The developmental and social psychological literature suggests that many juveniles
do not understand the contents of a Miranda warning or its legal ramifications and cannot exercise their rights.”);
Grisso, supra note 5, at 1158–59.
233. See Grisso, supra note 5, at 1153–54; see also Marrus, supra note 230, at 526–27 (summarizing Grisso’s
findings).
234. See Feld, supra note 173, at 78 (citing studies discussing reading comprehension).
235. See Rogers et al., Miranda Rights, supra note 220, at 7 (citing studies discussing oral comprehension
deficiencies).
236. See id. (“Juvenile offenders often exhibit limited verbal comprehension as a result of both deficient
intelligence and low academic achievement. Data on more than 12,000 detainees of the Texas Youth Commission
confirmed that juvenile offenders typically function four years below expected achievement levels, and that
nearly half have I.Q. test results below 90 (placing them in the lowest 25 percent).”).
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warnings, thereby compounding the problem of reading comprehension.237
The impairment of being a juvenile goes beyond mere comprehension issues,
however, because it also incorporates the reality that juveniles process the
interrogation differently than adults. This fact was recognized by the Supreme
Court in J.D.B. v. North Carolina.238 The Court acknowledged the heightened
pressures of custodial interrogation on juveniles:
Indeed, the pressure of custodial interrogation is so immense that it ‘can induce
a frighteningly high percentage of people to confess to crimes they never
committed.’ That risk is all the more troubling—and recent studies suggest all
the more acute—when the subject of custodial interrogation is a juvenile.239

As the Supreme Court detailed, the problem is that children “generally are less
mature and responsible than adults, that they often lack the experience, perspective, and judgment to recognize and avoid choices that could be detrimental to
them, that they are more vulnerable or susceptible to . . . outside pressures than
adults, and so on.”240
Beyond the coercive nature of the interrogation, the Supreme Court acknowledged the limits of juvenile cognition in Graham v. Florida and Roper v. Simmons
and recognized that juveniles as a group deserve to be treated differently because
of their youth.241 For criminal responsibility questions, juveniles have a lower
level of culpability242 and a lower level of maturity and responsibility.243 Simply

237. See id. (“One evaluation of 122 juvenile Miranda warnings from across the United States found—most
unexpectedly—that juvenile Miranda warnings tend to be more than 50 words longer than those general warnings
intended for all age groups. The range was extraordinary: 52 to 526 words for the warning itself, and 64 to 1,020
words for the total Miranda material. Additionally, reading levels for the juvenile Miranda warnings were
actually slightly higher than warnings intended for general use.” (internal citations omitted)).
238. 131 S. Ct. 2394, 2403 (2011).
239. Id. at 2401 (citations omitted).
240. Id. at 2403 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); see id. (“Addressing the specific context of
police interrogation, we have observed that events that ‘would leave a man cold and unimpressed can overawe
and overwhelm a lad in his early teens.’” (quoting Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596, 599 (1948) (plurality opinion))).
The takeaway from this reality is that even when properly informed about Miranda warnings, juveniles may still
waive them. It may be the case, then, that some additional protection needs to be included in Miranda warnings
with juveniles. See id. at 2401 n.4.
241. See Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2026–27 (2010) (finding life imprisonment without parole
unconstitutional as punishment for non-homicide crimes committed while under the age of eighteen); Roper v.
Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 569 (2005) (finding capital punishment unconstitutional as punishment for crimes
committed while under the age of eighteen); see also Birckhead, supra note 185, at 389 (recognizing the impact of
social science research on the Supreme Court’s decisions about juveniles); Cauffman et al., supra note 228, at 407
(concluding that psychosocial factors and cognitive factors differentiate adolescents and adults in terms of
understanding competence).
242. See Roper, 543 U.S. at 570–71 (discussing the diminished culpability of juveniles in light of their
established lack of maturity, their impetuousness, and their recklessness); see also J.D.B., 131 S. Ct. at 2404
(“[O]ur history is ‘replete with laws and judicial recognition’ that children cannot be viewed simply as miniature
adults.” (quoting Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 115–16 (1982) (alteration in original))); Donna M. Bishop
& Hillary B. Farber, Joining the Legal Significance of Adolescent Developmental Capacities with the Legal Rights
Provided by In Re Gault, 60 RUTGERS L. REV. 125 (2007).
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stated, the Supreme Court recognized that juveniles are not fully formed244 and are
susceptible to negative peer pressure.245
In a Miranda waiver situation, this lack of developmental maturity246 manifests
itself in a few ways. First, juveniles are more likely to waive Miranda rights
because they act on a more “present-focused” risk/reward calculation.247 This is
not simply youthful immaturity, but also a function of physical and chemical
developmental capacities in the brain.248 Second, juveniles tend to be more
deferential to authority figures such as interrogating police officers.249 Third,
juveniles are less likely than adults to admit when they do not understand.250
Again, under the real-world pressure of custodial interrogation, these factors can
result in an unknowing and unintelligent relinquishment of constitutional rights.
Compounding the normal consequences of youth is the reality that many
juveniles in the juvenile justice system are especially vulnerable, being both young
and suffering from developmental disabilities or mental illness. Statistically,
juveniles in the juvenile justice system tend to be more educationally disadvantaged than adults.251 Learning disabilities are commonplace.252 Studies show that

243. See Roper, 543 U.S. at 569 (“[A]s any parent knows and as the scientific and sociological studies
respondent and his amici cite tend to confirm, ‘a lack of maturity and an underdeveloped sense of responsibility
are found in youth more often than in adults . . . .’” (citing Johnson v. Texas, 509 U.S. 350, 367 (1993))); see also
King, supra note 230, 434–44 (evaluating scholarship on psychosocial development and neuroscience advances
in adolescent brain development).
244. See Roper, 543 U.S. at 567–75; see also Rogers et al., Gudjonsson Suggestibility Scales, supra note 208,
at 67.
245. See Roper, 543 U.S. at 569 (“[J]uveniles are more vulnerable or susceptible to negative influences and
outside pressures, including peer pressures.” (citation omitted)).
246. Cf. Birckhead, supra note 185, at 429 (“The critical point here . . . is that the common denominator for
young victims and juvenile suspects who are questioned is their developmental posture. Regardless of whether the
investigator believes the juvenile to be a suspect, witness, or victim, the youth may be incapable of adult reasoning
during questioning because of the long maturation process of the adolescent brain. As a result of cognitive and
social immaturity, she may have difficulty understanding the substance, relevance, and significance of the
questions posed.” (footnotes omitted)).
247. Bishop & Farber, supra note 242, at 152–53; King, supra note 230, at 436 (citing Laurence Steinberg &
Elizabeth S. Scott, Less Guilty by Reason of Adolescence: Developmental Immaturity, Diminished Responsibility,
and the Juvenile Death Penalty, 58 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 1009, 1012 (2003)).
248. See Bishop & Farber, supra note 242, at 152 (evaluating advances in neuropsychological research); King,
supra note 230, at 435–36; Tomas Paus, Mapping Brain Maturation and Cognitive Development During
Adolescence, 9 TRENDS COGNITIVE SCI. 60, 61–63 (2005).
249. See King, supra note 230, at 471–72 (discussing juveniles’ tendency towards deference).
250. Id. at 459.
251. See id. at 443–44; Rogers et al., Gudjonsson Suggestibility Scales, supra note 208, at 82 (“[F]indings
from the current study combined with early research make it clear that preteen suspects are rarely able to
appreciate the typical Miranda warnings presented to them, thus making any waiver of questionable validity.
Even older adolescent suspects are unlikely to understand critical components of the warnings and waivers in
current use, particularly when educational, intellectual, and mental health limitations are considered.”).
252. See Pamela M. Henry-Mays, Farewell Michael C., Hello Gault: Considering the Miranda Rights of
Learning Disabled Children, 34 N. KY. L. REV. 343, 350 (2007) (recognizing the special problem of special
education students and Miranda comprehension); Peter E. Leone et al., Understanding the Overrepresentation of
Youths with Disabilities in Juvenile Detention, 3 D.C. L. REV. 389, 389 (1995); Rogers et al., Comprehensibility
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juveniles with learning disabilities range from thirty to seventy percent of the
juvenile delinquent population.253 Additionally, a significant percentage of juveniles in the system suffer from an intellectual disability, substance abuse problems,
or mental illness.254 Some estimates are that as many as seventy percent of youth
arrested as juveniles have diagnosable mental illness.255 The conclusion of the
White Paper and most studies on the subject is that juveniles, especially those
under the age of sixteen, define the type of vulnerable population that might
unknowingly or unintelligently waive Miranda warnings.256
C. White Paper Conclusion on Vulnerable Populations
As is evident, the White Paper, consistent with the conclusions of prior scientific
studies, found that existing Miranda practice does not protect vulnerable populations. Even in non-stressful situations, the studies show that juveniles and
individuals with “serious psychological disorders,” or with “mental retardation,”
have “substantial impairment in understanding of Miranda.”257 This is in comparison to “average” adults in similar situations who do not share a similar impairment
in understanding.258 This conclusion, among other concerns about current Miranda practice,259 necessitates a new way of looking at the problem of Miranda
waiver.
III. THE DIALOGUE APPROACH
The dialogue approach to Miranda waiver emerges from the convergence of
these trends in law and scientific understanding. Because the Supreme Court has

and Content, supra note 226, at 79 (“The Texas Youth Commission (2006) systematically examined 12,837
delinquents entering its facilities across the fiscal years from 2002 to 2006. With a median age of 16 years,
delinquents’ average reading levels ranged from 5.8 to 6.0 across these 5 years and were 4 years below the
expected achievement levels. Most had not completed the ninth grade.”).
253. Henry-Mays, supra note 252, at 356.
254. See King, supra note 230, at 444 (citing national and state studies that show rates of mental illness are
high in juvenile detention); Fact Sheet: Prevalence of Mental Disorders Among Children in the Juvenile Justice
System, MENTAL HEALTH AM., https://www.mentalhealthamerica.net/children/justjuv/prevalence.cfm (last visited
Feb. 27, 2012).
255. See Rogers et al., Comprehensibility and Content, supra note 226, at 79 (discussing National Center for
Mental Health and Juvenile Justice study).
256. Kassin et al., White Paper, supra note 29, at 8.
257. Id.
258. Id.
259. As a final concern, the White Paper recognized that the variations in the way warnings were administered
could have an effect on comprehension. See id. at 7 (“Miranda warning forms varied considerably in what they
conveyed. For example, only 32% of the forms told suspects that legal counsel could be obtained without charge.
Thus, many warning forms raise serious doubts about the knowing and intelligent waiver of rights by almost any
suspect who is ‘informed’ by them.”). Notably, the variations in the language of the warnings had the effect of
undermining their effectiveness. Rogers et al., Comprehensibility and Content, supra note 226, at 67.
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now granted police officers more flexibility in reading the warnings,260 and
because suspects must now communicate to those officers in order to invoke their
rights,261 the traditional formalities that have governed the warnings become less
rigid. Further, because there now exists a scientific consensus that traditional
Miranda warnings fail to protect certain populations,262 there is a need for change.
Finally, because there is a recognized gap in the factual record about what
precisely the suspect understood at the time of the interrogation, filling that gap
should be encouraged as a way to improve decision-making by courts.
This Part proceeds in two steps. First, it sets out the legal and scientific
framework for a dialogue approach to Miranda waivers. Inspired by the actual
forensic tests developed by Thomas Grisso and used to evaluate suspects’
understanding of Miranda (after the interrogation),263 this approach provides a
basis to evaluate the understanding of the defendant at the time of the interrogation. This proposed real-time test of understanding can be used on all suspects,
although it is perhaps best analyzed by examining waivers with vulnerable
suspects.
The second step is to look at the dialogue approach in practice. Using a
documented example of such an approach, it can be demonstrated how the
dialogue approach addresses some of the concerns detailed in the White Paper and
points to lessons for the future. The final Part will address the resulting difficulties,
objections, and concerns with this proposed approach.
A. The Grisso Tests
As instruments of Miranda comprehension, the Grisso tests are the gold
standard in the forensic psychology community.264 The Grisso tests have been
scientifically validated265 and legally accepted in many courts.266 Experiments

260. See Florida v. Powell, 130 S. Ct. 1195, 1204 (2010) (finding that officers need not recite rote Miranda
warnings).
261. See Berghuis v. Thompkins, 130 S. Ct. 2250, 2264 (2010) (finding a suspect must invoke his rights to both
counsel and to remain silent).
262. See supra Part II.B.
263. GRISSO, EVALUATING COMPETENCIES, supra note 5, at 149; Grisso, supra note 5, at 1151–52. The Grisso
tests have also been updated. See Rachel Kahn et al., Readability of Miranda Warnings and Waivers: Implications
for Evaluating Miranda Comprehension, 30 LAW & PSYCHOL. REV. 119, 125 (2006) (“Grisso’s assessment
instruments have recently been revised to include simpler language as well as the addition of the fifth prong. The
revised version of the instrument is also composed of four parts: Comprehension of Miranda Rights II (CMR-II),
Comprehension of Miranda Rights Recognition II (CMR-R-II), Comprehension of Miranda Vocabulary II
(CMV-II), and the original Function of Rights in Interrogation (FRI).” (citations omitted)).
264. Fulero & Everington, supra note 4, at 61 (“The Grisso test battery . . . provides an objective measure that
can assist forensic psychologists and defense attorneys in determining the validity of the defendant’s waiver of
rights.”); Kahn et al., supra note 263, at 123–24.
265. See Bishop & Farber, supra note 242, at 162–64 (summarizing Grisso’s findings); Cooper & Zapf, supra
note 4, at 392 (“A more recent study showed that about one fourth of surveyed APA members who listed forensic
psychology as an area of interest or practice conduct Miranda evaluations and, of those evaluators, about 44% use
Grisso’s Miranda instruments.” (citations omitted)); see also id. (“Another recent survey identified Grisso’s
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using the tests have been replicated with consistent findings and reported in
respected academic and professional forums.267 As a result, the legal community
has accepted the scientific rigor and underlying conclusions with only some
disagreement.268 While designed to evaluate a suspect after the interrogation, their
format, construction, and insights into cognitive processing provide a useful
starting point to develop an approach inside the interrogation room.
1. Explaining the Grisso Tests
The Grisso tests provide data to assess a knowing and intelligent waiver of Fifth
Amendment rights. As part of a complete forensic assessment,269 the instruments
provide insight into the capacity and competency of an individual to waive
Miranda rights.270 In simple terms, four tests (“assessment mechanisms”) are
given to defendants to test their functional abilities to “know, understand, believe

Miranda instruments as the fourth most popular test in adult forensic evaluations of competency or sanity—more
popular than the only criminal responsibility measure and many competency to stand trial measures.” (citations
omitted)); Thomas F. Geraghty & Steven A. Drizin, Charting a New Course for Juvenile Justice: Listening to
Outsiders, 90 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 363, 378 (1999) (reviewing Grisso’s studies and evaluations).
266. See Fulero & Everington, supra note 4, at 64 (“As courts are increasingly requiring experts to make
opinions based on standardized and validated assessment procedures, this instrument has utility in providing some
empirical data regarding the defendant’s understanding.”); see, e.g., Garner v. Mitchell, 557 F.3d 257, 264 (6th
Cir. 2009) (adopting Grisso analysis as part of waiver analysis); Smith v. Mullin, 379 F.3d 919, 933 (10th Cir.
2004) (acknowledging, although ultimately rejecting, conclusions of expert based on Grisso tests); State v.
Caldwell, 611 So. 2d 1149, 1150 (Ala. Crim. App. 1992) (upholding trial court’s suppression of statements based
in part on Grisso tests); People v. Jenkins, 122 Cal. App. 4th 1160, 1172 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004); Robinson v. United
States, 928 A.2d 717, 727 (D.C. 2007) (relying on expert’s finding based on Grisso test to uphold valid waiver);
see also Danielle E. Chojnacki, Michael D. Cicchini & Lawrence T. White, An Empirical Basis for the Admission
of Expert Testimony on False Confessions, 40 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1, 14 (2008). But see Murphy v. Ohio, 551 F.3d 485,
515 (6th Cir. 2009) (noting that the court “has not yet determined the reliability of the results of the Grisso test”
(citing Garner, 557 F.3d at 414)); State v. Griffin, 869 A.2d 640, 646 (Conn. 2005) (finding no abuse of discretion
in trial court’s finding that testimony based on Grisso test did not pass state law for admissibility); People v. Cole,
807 N.Y.S.2d 166, 170 (N.Y. App. Div. 2005) (same).
267. Frumkin & Garcia, supra note 31, at 16 (“Grisso’s research was recently replicated by Professor Morgan
Cloud and others. The findings of that study are consistent with Grisso’s.”); Kahn, supra note 263, at 124–25 (“All
four [Grisso] subtests show a relationship to age and IQ.”).
268. “Grisso’s instruments and the research that established their reliability and validity have been widely
accepted by leading experts in the field of forensic psychology and, thus, meet not only Daubert, but also Frye.”
Frumkin, Competency, supra note 7, at 330; Frumkin, Psychological Evaluations, supra note 9, at 162 (“The
Grisso tests would appear to have no difficulty meeting a Daubert standard for admissibility. Grisso’s research
was a model of scientific rigor, relying upon standardized and controlled methodology. His use of legal
consultants to assist in defining concepts and developing scoring criteria makes his research and resultant tests
quite applicable to legal contexts. The approach to using the instruments is based upon a functional assessment of
competence which ties into abilities and capacities defendants need in order to be competent to waive their rights.
The reliability and validity of these instruments are well described in the test manual and original publication of
the research. All of this presumably easily satisfies Daubert’s ‘testability’ factor.”).
269. Frumkin, Psychological Evaluation, supra note 9, at 140 (identifying the need for a complete assessment
of defendant’s “psychological functioning”).
270. GRISSO, EVALUATING COMPETENCIES, supra note 5, at 149 (recognizing that the question presented to
courts is “the capacities or competence of defendants to have understood their rights and to have waived them
voluntarily prior to making the confession to police officers”).
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or do (functional abilities) in order to make an informed decision about waiver of
rights.”271
In measuring a defendant’s abilities, these tests address each of the three
functional components necessary for waiver: (1) “understanding of the Miranda
warnings” (i.e., the words and phrases used to convey to them the rights to silence
and legal counsel);272 (2) “perceptions of the intended functions of the rights”273
(i.e., establishing an accurate perception about the adversarial nature of the
interrogation, the attorney-client relationship, and the right against selfincrimination);274 and (3) “expectancies and reasoning concerning probable outcomes of waiver or non-waiver of the rights” (i.e., the capacity to reason about the
probable consequence of waiver or non-waiver decisions).275 In legal terms, the
first functional component parallels what is necessary for a “knowing” waiver, and
the latter two are focused on determining an “intelligent” waiver.276
For example, one of the assessment mechanisms is the Comprehension of
Miranda Rights (“CMR”) test.277 The CMR was created to evaluate a defendant’s
capacity to understand his or her Miranda rights.278 Under the CMR, the standard

271. Id. at 158.
272. Id. at 159; see Frumkin, Competency, supra note 7, at 326 (“According to forensic psychologist Thomas
Grisso, a knowing waiver is the ‘sum of suspects’ abilities to understand plus the manner in which they are
informed.’”).
273. GRISSO, EVALUATING COMPETENCIES, supra note 5, at 159; see Frumkin, Competency, supra note 7, at 326
(“According to Grisso, an intelligent waiver is a ‘decision-making capacity, involving a consideration of one’s
options and weighing their consequences . . . .’”).
274. GRISSO, EVALUATING COMPETENCIES, supra note 5, at 158.
275. Id. at 159. “An unintelligent waiver results from making a decision to waive the rights based on a
misunderstanding of the legal process and how it applies both personally and in the abstract.” Frumkin,
Psychological Evaluation, supra note 9, at 139. As Dr. Frumkin explains, “[f]or example, one may understand
(knowing component) about the right to have an attorney present during questioning. However, if the suspect
erroneously believes a defense attorney would only defend innocent defendants, then an intelligent use of the right
to counsel is not realized.” Id.
276. Frumkin, Psychological Evaluation, supra note 9, at 138–39 (“[I]ntelligent waiver . . . is generally
thought to signify being able to fully comprehend the meaning and effect of his decision to waive the rights and
make incriminating statements to police officers.” (internal citations omitted)). The tests mirror the reasoning
behind Moran v. Burbine, in which the Supreme Court held that “the waiver must have been made with a full
awareness of both the nature of the right being abandoned and the consequences of the decision to abandon it.” Id.
at 139 (citing Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 421 (1986)).
277. See GRISSO, EVALUATING COMPETENCIES, supra note 5, at 164 (“The Comprehension of Miranda Rights
(CMR) measure was developed to assess adolescents’ and adults’ understanding of the rights to silence and to
legal counsel, as these rights are conveyed by a standard form used in law enforcement procedures.”).
278. Id. The CMR is administered as follows:
The CMR is administered with the aid of a “flip-chart,” desk-top easel that shows examinee
stimuli on the side facing the examinee and administration instructions on the side facing the
examiner. The stimuli consist of the four Miranda warnings, shown individually, as follows:
1. You do not have to make a statement and have the right to remain silent.
2. Anything you say can and will be used against you in a court of law.
3. You are entitled to consult an attorney before interrogation and to have an attorney present at
the time of the interrogation.
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Miranda warnings are shown to a defendant, and then the examiner asks, “Tell me
in your own words what is said in that sentence.”279 After a defendant answers
those questions in his or her own words, the examiner scores the responses based
on a set criteria, assigning each response a point value based on “adequacy.”280
The scoring criteria were created by a “national panel of judges, lawyers, and legal
scholars [who] decided what type of response would indicate a full understanding
of the right.”281 The CMR is a limited inquiry in which understanding is “one
cognitive component that contributes to that broader construct as defined by legal
interpretations of competence to waive Miranda rights.”282
Two of the other assessment mechanisms involve comprehension of Miranda in
terms of recognition of and vocabulary used in the warnings. The Comprehension
of Miranda Rights—Recognition (“CMR-R”) test283 was designed to assess
“comprehension of Miranda warnings . . . by recognition of similar meanings
rather than by ability to construct a paraphrase response as in the CMR.”284 The
examinee is shown the Miranda warnings and asked three follow-up statements
which are either similar concepts or different concepts, and is then asked to

4. If you cannot afford an attorney, one will be appointed for you.
Each stimulus sentence is shown to the examinee and read aloud by the examiner in the testing
session. After each stimulus the examiner asks: “Tell me in your own words what is said in that
sentence.” Standardized inquiry questions are printed on the examiner side of the easel pages
requesting information when the examinee’s response uses certain phrases verbatim rather than
paraphrased, and when the initial response is vague or confusing.
Id. at 164–65; see Fulero & Everington, supra note 4, at 61–62 (applying the CMR to individuals with mental
retardation).
279. GRISSO, EVALUATING COMPETENCIES, supra note 5, at 165.
280. Id. The scoring criteria were created by examining: (1) responses from a pilot procedure conducted in a
juvenile detention facility, (2) studies made by several panels of legal consultants, (3) panel recommendations of
formal scoring criteria, and (4) empirical studies based on the reliability of scoring manuals. Id. at 166.
281. Frumkin, Psychological Evaluation, supra note 9, at 146.
282. GRISSO, EVALUATING COMPETENCIES, supra note 5, at 166–67.
283. See id. at 173. The CMR-R is administered as follows:
The CMR-R is administered with the aid of a “flip-chart,” desk-top easel that shows examinee
stimuli on the side facing the examinee and administration instructions on the side facing the
examiner. The stimuli consist of the four Miranda warnings, each shown individually, and worded
according to the four standard Miranda warnings statements used in the CMR . . . . The examinee
is shown and read the first warning statement and is told: “I will read three more statements. Each
statement means either the same thing or not the same thing as the [sentence on the card]. I want
you to tell me whether each statement is the same or different from the sentence on the card.” On
the stimulus page facing the examinee, three sentences are printed beneath the warning statement.
The examiner then reads the first of these sentences and asks whether it means the same thing or is
different from the Miranda warnings at the top of the page. The same is done for the second and
third alternatives. . . . The administration then proceeds to the second Miranda warning and its
three corresponding same-or-different items.
Id. at 173–74 (citations omitted).
284. Id. at 174; see Fulero & Everington, supra note 4, at 63 (applying the CMR-R to individuals with mental
retardation).
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respond to those statements.285 The goal is to assess whether the examinee
understands the concepts, rather than whether the examinee can rearticulate
them.286 It differs from the other assessment mechanisms because it requires less
verbal expressive abilities than the other tests.287
Similarly, the Comprehension of Miranda Vocabulary (“CMV”) test focuses on
the language rather than the content of the warnings.288 As other scholars have
recognized, one of the foundations to comprehension is understanding the vocabulary involved.289 Thus, the CMV was designed to assess the specific words in the
instructions.290 The assessment requires the examinee to provide the meaning for
the words, “consult,” “attorney,” “interrogation,” “appoint,” “entitled,” and
“right.”291 Again, there is a scoring mechanism in the actual testing manual.292
Finally, the Function of Rights in Interrogation (“FRI”) test seeks to “assess [an
examinee’s] perceptions of the function and significance of the right to silence and
legal counsel in the arrest and adjudicative process.”293 The assessment mechanism tests whether the examinee understands the nature of the interrogation,294 the

285. GRISSO, EVALUATING COMPETENCIES, supra note 5, at 173.
286. Id. at 174.
287. Id. at 173.
288. See id. at 177 (“Whereas the CMR and CMR-R assess understanding of the overall message conveyed by
the standard Miranda warnings, the CMV was intended to assess examinees’ understanding of specific words
within the warnings.”).
289. See Rogers et al., Vocabulary Scale, supra note 153, at 388 (“Miranda vocabulary forms the foundation
for adequate comprehension of Miranda rights and the ensuing decision of whether to exercise or forgo the
Constitutional protections inherent within these rights. It is difficult to imagine any intuitive leaps of insight that
would allow custodial suspects to successfully overcome inaccurate or irrelevant definitions of key Miranda
terms.” (citations omitted)).
290. See GRISSO, EVALUATING COMPETENCIES, supra note 5, at 178 (“Unlike the CMR and CMR-R, the CMV
was not intended to assess understanding of the Miranda warnings, but understanding of specific words within the
warnings.”). The theory behind the CMV is that “a person may understand the individual words within a message
yet misunderstand a message that employs those words. Conversely, one can sometimes understand a message
without understanding the meaning of each of its words outside the context of the message.” Id.
291. Id. at 177.
292. See id. at 177 (“Each response is scored . . . according to scoring criteria and examples provided for each
CMV stimulus word . . . .”). The CMV is administered as follows:
The CMV is administered with the aid of a “flip chart,” desk-top easel that shows examinee
stimuli on the side facing the examinee and administration instructions on the side facing the
examiner. The CMV requires that examinees be presented with six specific words taken from the
standard wording of the four Miranda warnings . . . : consult, attorney, interrogation, appoint,
entitled, and right. A word appears on the easel page facing the examinee, along with a sentence in
which the word is used (e.g., “Entitled: He is entitled to the money.”). The examiner reads the word
and the sentence aloud to the examinee, who is then asked to give the meaning of the word. The
manual specifies certain conditions in which further inquiry may be made to allow the examinee to
elaborate or clarify the response.
Id.
293. Id. at 181. The FRI was “intended to assess one’s beliefs about how the rights function and what their
importance might be to the juvenile or criminal court defendant.” Id.
294. See id. (defining the “nature of the interrogation” as “one’s perceptions concerning the roles of police and
suspects in interrogations”).
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right to counsel,295 and the right to silence296 by focusing on “why the rights might
be important in the legal process and how they might function in a protective
manner in the course of police investigations and prosecution.”297 In other words,
the assessment looks at the suspect’s “awareness of the adversarial nature of the
suspect-police relationship, the advocacy and cooperative nature of the suspectattorney relationship, and the irrevocable nature of the right to silence (that is, that
the right could not be abridged by legal authorities in the interrogation and
adjudication process.)”298 The test requires an examinee to comment on four
hypothetical stories relevant to the interrogation setting, and answer a series of set
questions about how the rights relate to those stories.299
The Grisso tests were designed for trained experts conducting a scientific
inquiry.300 This Article does not seek to alter the widespread use of the tests to
generate valid and scientifically reliable information. Instead, it seeks to adapt the
insights of the Grisso tests to help inform current police practice and to develop a
more complete record of functional abilities at the time of interrogation.

295. See id. (defining the “right to counsel” as “one’s perceptions of the roles of attorneys and suspects in
attorney/client relationships”).
296. See id. (defining the “right to silence” as “one’s perceptions of the power of the right to silence, especially
the degree to which it limits the discretionary power of legal authorities (e.g., police, judges)”).
297. Id. at 183.
298. Id. As an example, “in order to consider meaningfully the waiver of right to counsel, one would need to
know that an attorney is supposed to be an advocate, and one would have to believe that an attorney in fact would
play that role if one requested an attorney.” Id.
299. Id. at 182. The FRI is administered as follows:
The FRI is administered with the aid of a “flip-chart,” desk-top easel that shows examinee
stimuli on the side facing the examinee and administration instructions on the side facing the
examiner. The FRI stimuli consist of four pictures, corresponding hypothetical vignettes (hereinafter “stories”), and 15 questions (5 for each of the 3 subscales). Picture 1 depicts a suspect and two
police officers at a table in a bare room. The accompanying story, read aloud by the examiner,
explains:
This is a picture about a boy/man named Joe. The policemen in the picture have brought Joe into
the detention/police station. There has been a crime. The policemen want to talk to Joe. Remember
that Joe is in detention/police station and the policemen want to talk to him/her.
The examinee then is asked five questions relating to the “Nature of Interrogation” subscale
(e.g., “What is it that the policemen will want Joe to do?” “How is Joe probably feeling?”).
Picture 2 shows a suspect seated with a lawyer, and the story identifies this as a meeting between
the suspect and the suspect’s lawyer prior to questioning by police. Four questions related to the
“Right to Counsel” subscale are asked (e.g., “What is the main job of the lawyer?” “While he is
talking with his lawyer, what is Tim suppose to do?”). Picture 3 is another interrogation scene with
three questions related to the “Right to Silence” subscale (e.g., “Finish this sentence: If Greg
decides to tell the police about what he did, then the things he says . . . ”). Picture 4 shows a court
hearing in process. The story identifies the participants and leads to three questions, one of them
relating to “Right to Counsel” and the other two related to “Right to Silence” (e.g., “Greg did not
tell the police anything about what he did. Here in court, if he were told to talk about what he did
that was wrong, will he have to talk about it?”).”
Id. (citations omitted).
300. Id. at 157; Frumkin & Garcia, supra note 31, at 145.
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2. Adapting the Grisso Tests
The dialogue approach to Miranda waivers seeks to apply the theory behind the
Grisso tests to the interrogation room at the most relevant time period.301 The
dialogue approach attempts to develop a better factual record by encouraging more
detailed and focused communication between the parties at the relevant time.302
To apply this approach, go back to the typical interrogation situation described
at the outset of this Article. A suspect is arrested and brought to the police station.
Perhaps the detective knows the suspect is a juvenile,303 or the suspect has
manifested some cognitive or mental limitations. A “red flag” is raised.304 In the
interrogation room, the detective reads the suspect Miranda warnings off a card or
other form. The suspect acknowledges the reading of the warnings. Then the
detective takes three simple steps to ensure the knowing and intelligent nature of
this understanding.
After inquiring if the suspect understood her rights, the detective would first ask
the defendant to rephrase the warning in her own words. This step parallels the
Grisso CMR test305 as the resulting answers provide a baseline for how “knowingly” a suspect understands the Miranda rights.306 It also provides an indicator of
comprehension and cognitive understanding that experts and judges can later use
to evaluate a waiver’s validity. Under Powell, such off-script questioning is
constitutionally permissible,307 and the detective would have the ability to correct
any misunderstandings or misstatements of the suspect.308

301. In so applying the general theory, there is no claim that the actual assessment mechanisms are being used,
or that the full battery of tests should not be used at a later time as a part of a complete (and traditional) forensic
psychological evaluation. Only trained, qualified experts should be entrusted with conducting the forensic
evaluations, and there is no reason to burden already overworked law enforcement professionals with additional
requirements.
302. In fact, one of the reasons why courts have declined to follow the expert opinion derived from the Grisso
tests is that they were conducted after the time of the interrogation. See Garner v. Mitchell, 557 F.3d 257, 266 (6th
Cir. 2009) (“Dr. Everington administered the Grisso test in 1998, over six years after Garner was interrogated by
police.”); Smith v. Mullin, 379 F.3d 919, 933 (10th Cir. 2004) (“[T]he Grisso test Dr. Hopewell administered took
place years after Mr. Smith’s interrogation and the deterioration of his condition in jail could have affected the
results.”).
303. After J.D.B. v. North Carolina, determining age is now a required step. 131 S. Ct. 2394, 2403 (2011) (“A
child’s age is far more than a chronological fact. It is a fact that ‘generates commonsense conclusions about
behavior and perception.’ Such conclusions apply broadly to children as a class. And, they are self-evident to
anyone who was a child once himself, including any police officer or judge.” (citations omitted)).
304. See Sinclair v. Wainwright, 814 F.2d 1516, 1523 (11th Cir. 1987) (referring to signs of incompetency as
“red flags”); United States v. Crosby, 462 F.2d 1201, 1203 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (same).
305. See GRISSO, PSYCHOLOGICAL EVALUATIONS, supra note 5, at 164–65 (describing the CMR test).
306. See id.; see also SOLAN & TIERMSA, supra note 191, at 80 (proposing a multiple choice test to assess
understanding of suspects with low intelligence).
307. See Florida v. Powell, 130 S. Ct. 1195, 1204 (2010) (finding that officers need not provide Miranda
warnings by rote recitation).
308. See infra Part IV.B.1 (discussing concerns about the incentives for police officers to clean up the record or
manipulate the dialogue).

2012]

THE DIALOGUE APPROACH TO MIRANDA WARNINGS AND WAIVER

1475

Second, the detective could ask the suspect whether she understands some of the
critical vocabulary words in the Miranda warnings. While the traditional Grisso
CMV test requires inquiry into six words,309 the detective need not go through all
of them. The detective could say, “I just mentioned the word ‘appoint,’ (or ‘right’).
What do you understand that to mean?” Taking a sample of three or so words
would provide a base level of understanding of vocabulary. Again, the purpose is
to gauge the level of comprehension of the suspect at the most relevant time.
Finally, the detective would ask the functional questions about the context of the
situation. A detective could ask, “Do you know what a lawyer would do if he or she
were here?” “Do you know how the right to silence works here?” “Do you know
how the right to silence works in court?” Again, there need not be a formal list of
questions, but simply an inquiry into the central components of the Miranda
protections—the role of the interrogator, the role of the counsel, and the right to
silence. Paralleling the Grisso FRI test,310 the resulting conversation provides an
opportunity to assess the “intelligent” understanding of Miranda in real time.311
Further, because Berghuis now requires a suspect affirmatively to speak to invoke
his rights,312 there should be little complaint that the suspect is required to
demonstrate that she understands her rights before she invokes or waives them.
To be clear, the focus of this approach is less on the officer’s interpretation of the
answers and more on the record that is developed from the answers. In most cases,
the suspect will have waived his or her Miranda rights and confessed, prompting a
legal decision about the validity of a waiver.313 Although the recorded answers will
not be definitive, they can contribute to an expert evaluation and the court’s
ultimate legal conclusion.
B. Real World Example
To examine the benefits of the dialogue approach, it is useful to look at a real
world interrogation with a vulnerable suspect. One representative example was

309. See GRISSO, PSYCHOLOGICAL EVALUATIONS, supra note 5, at 177 (describing the CMV test).
310. See id. at 181–82 (describing the FRI test).
311. The use of real-time analysis effectively eliminates the prior objection, as articulated in Garner v.
Mitchell, that the Grisso test is often administered after the trial and therefore potentially inaccurate. 557 F.3d 257,
270 (6th Cir. 2009) (“In this case, Dr. Everington administered the test in 1998, over six years after police read the
warnings to Garner. Leaving aside the obvious incentive for a defendant who has already been sentenced to death
to feign misunderstanding on such a test, there is simply no way of telling whether Garner’s Grisso test scores are
an accurate indicator of his ability to understand the warnings when police administered the warnings in 1992.
This is so regardless of the fact that studies have indicated that Grisso test scores are generally positively
correlated with age.”).
312. See Berghuis v. Thompkins, 130 S. Ct. 2250, 2260 (2010) (requiring invocation of both the right to
silence and the right to counsel).
313. By the time of the contested Miranda waiver hearing, a disputed confession has already raised the issue of
the invalid waiver.
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memorialized in Dr. Gregory DeClue’s article Oral Miranda Waiver.314 The
interrogation involved a seventeen year-old girl named “L” who was suspected of
murder and interrogated by a detective concerned with L’s understanding of the
warnings.315 As indicated in the following excerpt, the conversation achieves some
of the goals of the dialogue approach without impeding the presentation and
waiver of rights:
Excerpt from Transcript of the Interrogation of L
– Detective G: There’s a couple things that we want you to know. I understand
that since you’ve been here you’ve been great. You’ve been talking to
everybody and trying to tell your side of the story. Our job is to gather all of
the facts, okay, and try to put this whole picture together. It’s kind of like a
big jigsaw puzzle. We try to put it together. We had to talk to a bunch of
people and get a whole bunch of information and you’re kind of the last
person on the list to talk to, so we can get your side. But there’s some things I
want to go over first before we talk about any of that stuff. How old are you?
– L: Seventeen.
– Detective G: Okay, um, do you go to school?
– L: No.
– Detective G: . . . How far did you go in school? . . . What kind of grades did
you get? . . . Do you drive? . . . Did you ever get a driver’s license? . . .
Have you ever been in trouble with the police before? . . . Have you ever
been to court before? . . . Do you think you understand the court system a
little bit? . . . I’m sure you’ve watched television and seen different things.
When somebody gets arrested for a crime there’s certain rights that they
have. I’m gonna go over those rights with you because I want to make sure
that you understand them. The first right that they talk about is: I understand
that I have a right to remain silent. Do you understand that?
– L: Mm-hm [yes].
– Detective G: What does that mean?
– L: I’m not s’pose to say anything.
– Detective G: Is it you’re not supposed to say anything or you don’t have to
say anything?
– L: I don’t have to say anything.
– Detective G: Okay. So if you want to say something you could, but if you
didn’t want to, you also have that right.
– L: Okay.
– Detective G: I understand that anything I say can be used against me in a
court of law. Do you understand that?
– L: Mm-hm [yes].
– Detective G: What does that mean?

314. Gregory DeClue, Oral Miranda Warnings: A Checklist and a Model Presentation, 35 J. PSYCHIATRY & L.
421 (2007).
315. See id. at 423, 433.
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– L: That mean anything I say, that could be brought up again in court.
– Detective G: Correct. I understand that I have a right to talk to an attorney
and have him or her present with me while I’m being questioned. Do you
understand that?
– L: Mm-hm [yes].
– Detective G: What does that mean to you?
– L: That I could hire a lawyer and that, um, discussing it, he be right there.
– Detective G: He could be with you, or she could be with you, when you’re
talking.
– L: Mm-hm [yes].
– Detective G: Okay. I understand that if I want an attorney and cannot afford
one that an attorney will be appointed to represent me free of charge before
any questioning. Do you understand that?
– L: Mm-hm [yes].
– Detective G: What does that mean?
– L: Like a public defender.
– Detective G: Okay, um, if you came in here today and you had no money to
afford, to pay for an attorney, would you still have the right to have one
before we talked?
– L: Mm. I don’t know. Yeah. I don’t know.
– Detective G: Okay. Let’s go over that. It says [pointing to the page] if I want
an attorney and cannot afford one that an attorney will be appointed to
represent me free of charge before any questioning.
– L: Okay.
– Detective G: Okay. So in other words if you came in here and you didn’t have
the money for an attorney but you wanted one, you could get one before you
talked. Is that right or wrong?
– L: Right.
– Detective G: Okay. And feel free to correct me if I say something that’s not
correct. Okay. I understand that at any time I can decide to exercise these
rights and not answer any questions or make any statements. Do you
understand that?
– L: Yeah.
– Detective G: What does that mean?
– L: If you ask me a question, that I don’t have to answer it.
– Detective G: Correct. If we talked for however long we talked and all of a
sudden you decided, you know what, I don’t want to talk anymore, do you
have that right?
– L: Mm-hm [yes].
– Detective G: Yes you do. Okay. Understanding these rights explained to me I
wish to make a statement at this time. Would you like to talk about what
happened today?
– [L answers yes or no at that point.]316

316. Id. at 433–35 (emphasis added).
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While the detective did not employ any formal technique, he did attempt to
foster a dialogue with the suspect in order to ensure that she knowingly and
intelligently understood her rights. The detective also focused on factual and
contextual understanding, clarifying the meaning of the suspect’s rights throughout the conversation. Although concerns with vocabulary remain, the dialogue
created a more detailed record from which experts can evaluate the validity of the
waiver.
This exchange demonstrates how the same Miranda warning can be provided in
a manner that ensures a better understanding, with minimal changes to existing
practice. As a comparison, imagine the conversation without the additional
dialogue. In response to every Miranda question, L says, “Mm-hm [yes]” to the
questions about the right to silence,317 the understanding that anything she says
can be used against her,318 the right to talk to an attorney,319 the right to free
counsel,320 and the right to stop the questioning at any point.321 Had there been no
follow-up by the detective, one could imagine an affirmative waiver of rights
despite there being no record to understand if L really did knowingly and
intelligently understand those rights. If the confession were to be contested without
the dialogue, there would be litigation weeks or months down the road about
whether “Mm-hm [yes]” constituted a knowing and intelligent waiver. Experts
would be required to evaluate a sparse record and rely on indirect methods to
determine waiver.
The additional dialogue makes the decision of the trial court easier if L’s waiver
is litigated. While under existing Supreme Court precedent the waiver on its own
would likely have been constitutionally adequate (“Mm-hm [yes]” constitutes
waiver),322 the added exchange showed that L did not comprehend her rights at
first. When asked if she understood the right to remain silent, L answered, “I’m not
s’pose to say anything.”323 When asked if she understood that she could have a

317. Id. at 433 (“Detective G: The first right that they talk about is: I understand that I have a right to remain
silent. Do you understand that? L: Mm-hm [yes].”).
318. Id. at 434 (“Detective G: I understand that anything I say can be used against me in a court of law. Do you
understand that? L: Mm-hm [yes].”).
319. Id. (“Detective G: Correct. I understand that I have a right to talk to an attorney and have him or her
present with me while I’m being questioned. Do you understand that? L: Mm-hm [yes].”).
320. Id. (“Detective G: Okay. I understand that if I want an attorney and cannot afford one that an attorney will
be appointed to represent me free of charge before any questioning. Do you understand that? L: Mm-hm [yes].”).
321. Id. at 435 (“Detective G: Correct. If we talked for however long we talked and all of a sudden you
decided, you know what, I don’t want to talk anymore, do you have that right? L: Mm-hm [yes].”).
322. See Berghuis v. Thompkins, 130 S. Ct. 2250, 2260, 2264 (2010) (holding suspect must affirmatively
invoke rights by making a statement to the police and that Thompkins waived his rights by making a voluntary
statement to the police). Lower courts have been remarkably open to finding constitutional waiver despite facts
detailing significant impairment of cognitive development. See, e.g., Garner v. Mitchell, 557 F.3d 257, 261–63
(6th Cir. 2009) (finding that defendant with an IQ of 76 waived his Miranda rights by responding that he
understood his rights because “nothing in the record indicate[d] that Garner verbally expressed a misunderstanding to police officers or otherwise engaged in conduct indicative of a misunderstanding”).
323. DeClue, supra note 314, at 433.
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right to a lawyer as they talked, she said, “I don’t know.”324 Both answers showed
a lack of understanding, and certainly not a full awareness. The additional dialogue
helps the trial court make a decision because the suspect is better informed and the
admissibility of the confession is ultimately less contestable.
It is the dialogue that shifts an “unintelligent” waiver into an intelligent waiver.
It is only after conversing with the detective that L knowingly and intelligently
understood her rights. The dialogue approach allows for an on-the-spot education
by the detective and allows L to show that she understood the lesson taught. The
dialogue with L is but one demonstration325 of how the predicate foundation of
Miranda understanding can be grounded in a factual record that does not
undermine the interrogation.326
IV. CONCERNS
The benefits of the proposed dialogue approach to Miranda warnings and
waiver also come with logistical and legal costs. Historically, any change in
criminal procedure is difficult to implement.327 Any change that requires additional work by law enforcement and simultaneously infringes on individual
constitutional rights makes implementation even more challenging.328 Any modification in practice that applies scientific principles in admittedly unscientific ways
is concerning, and must be analyzed with care. Yet in looking at existing practice
and the potential to address and improve the court’s ability to resolve hard
questions about fundamental constitutional rights, change, even difficult change,
may be necessary.
A. Logistical Concerns
Two logistical concerns present the biggest challenges to the dialogue approach.
First, while the dialogue approach is not limited to vulnerable suspects, it is
324. Id. at 434.
325. See Feld, supra note 173, at 79–81 (noting dialogue between officer and juvenile where officer asks
juveniles to repeat back their understanding of their rights in their own words).
326. It might still be argued that we cannot tell if L fully understood her rights. The fact is, however, that courts
would have much better information to make a decision on the legal issue.
327. The battle over the social costs of complying with Miranda is a prime example. Compare Paul G. Cassell,
Miranda’s Social Costs: An Empirical Reassessment, 90 NW. U. L. REV. 387, 498–99 (1996) (detailing the high
social costs of Miranda and potential alternatives), and Paul G. Cassell & Bret S. Hayman, Police Interrogation in
the 1990s: An Empirical Study of the Effects of Miranda, 43 UCLA L. REV. 839, 917–19 (1996) (same), with
Stephen J. Schulhofer, Miranda’s Practical Effect: Substantial Benefits and Vanishingly Small Social Costs, 90
NW. U. L. REV. 500, 547 (1996) (“For all practical purposes, Miranda’s empirically detectable net damage to law
enforcement is zero.”). See generally Richard A. Leo & Welsh S. White, Adapting to Miranda: Modern
Interrogators’ Strategies for Dealing with the Obstacles Posed by Miranda, 84 MINN. L. REV. 397, 472 (1999)
(noting that police have adapted and overcome many of Miranda’s obstacles); Marvin Zalman & Brad W. Smith,
The Attitudes of Police Executives Toward Miranda and Interrogation Policies, 97 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
873, 937–39 (2007) (emphasizing the important role of Miranda despite its costs).
328. See J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 131 S. Ct. 2394, 2415 (2011) (Alito, J., dissenting) (warning that changes in
Miranda custody doctrine will burden police).
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perhaps most necessary with vulnerable suspects, which, in turn, requires identifying “vulnerable suspects.” Second, it requires adequate recording mechanisms to
document the conversation in the interrogation room.
First, police identification of vulnerable suspects is a significant issue. Suspects
under eighteen and those individuals with documented developmental disabilities
or active mental illness will generally be easier to identify.329 After all, age is a
routine booking question330 and a factor for determining Miranda custody under
J.D.B. v. North Carolina.331 Further, a suspect’s requests for medication, difficulties in comprehending basic instructions, and general demeanor might indicate that
a suspect has mental limitations. However, for the tens of thousands of individuals
who are interrogated without obvious “red flags”332 of an intellectual disability,
young age, or active mental illness, the selection is more difficult.
One proposed solution is to require the dialogue approach with all suspects. The
scientific literature demonstrates that most adults with average intellectual functioning have a good command of their rights.333 The dialogue process, while undoubtedly an extra step in the interrogation, should not result in any different outcome in
the Miranda waiver process. Such extra process for all without a defined need for
all might, of course, invite criticism as being burdensome on police. The compromise might be to require a dialogue approach any time the officer has a reasonable
belief that the suspect is “vulnerable.”334 In some cases this will be quite simple, in
others, more difficult, with the hope that an officer will err on the side of caution
for potentially vulnerable suspects. From a purely tactical vantage point, it would
reflect poorly on the officer if he or she missed the developmental disabilities of an
obviously vulnerable suspect. If it later turned out that a suspect was, in fact,
intellectually disabled and the detective had not taken any special steps to ensure a
constitutionally adequate understanding of the Miranda warnings, it might call
into question the rest of the procedures used to obtain a confession.

329. Many jurisdictions have special juvenile processing facilities. See, e.g., Williams v. State, 614 S.E.2d 146,
149 & n.3 (Ga. Ct. App. 2005) (recognizing the existence of separate juvenile intake procedures); Horton v. State,
78 S.W.3d 701, 704–07 (Tex. Ct. App. 2002) (same).
330. See Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 496 U.S. 582, 601 (1990) (characterizing suspect’s name, address, height,
weight, eye color, date of birth, and current age as “routine booking questions”).
331. See J.D.B., 131 S. Ct. at 2406 (“[S]o long as the child’s age was known to the officer at the time of police
questioning, or would have been objectively apparent to a reasonable officer, its inclusion in the custody analysis
is consistent with the objective nature of that test.”).
332. See, e.g., Sinclair v. Wainwright, 814 F.2d 1516, 1523 (11th Cir. 1987) (discussing trial court’s obligation
to inquire about competency after a “red flag” has been raised); United States v. Crosby, 462 F.2d 1201, 1203
(D.C. Cir. 1972) (same).
333. See Kassin et al., White Paper, supra note 29, at 8.
334. Courts could even establish a rebuttable presumption of inadmissibility, such that if an officer had a
reasonable belief that the suspect was vulnerable, and still took no extra steps to ensure a full understanding of
Miranda rights, then the statement would be deemed inadmissible.
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The second logistical issue involves the requirement of recording the interrogations in some fashion. If one of the goals of the dialogue approach is to develop a
record for expert and court analysis, then it is necessary to have a formal recording
of the questioning.335 Fortunately, electronic recording of interrogations is growing in both acceptance and use.336 Currently, “seventeen states and the District of
Columbia have enacted such requirements” and many states “that have not
mandated recording . . . have voluntarily instituted a policy requiring some type of
recording requirement.”337 “Over 500 jurisdictions have now enacted policies and
procedures requiring their officers to record confessions in certain circumstances.”338 Certainly, basic audio recording devices are readily available to police
officers, and with the lowered cost of video cameras and smartphone cameras,
expense is no longer a major impediment.339 As many commentators who have
studied the problem of false confessions and disputed waivers have recognized, a
videotape precludes much of the guesswork and litigation involved in these
cases.340 In order to establish a record to be reviewed by the court at a later time,
the best practice would be to record all interrogations of vulnerable suspects.341
B. Legal Concerns
In addition to the logistical concerns of identifying vulnerable suspects and
recording interrogations, there are more substantive concerns focused on the legal
consequences of the dialogue approach. This Section addresses some of the most
obvious concerns from the perspectives of the suspect, the police, and the experts.

335. Saul M. Kassin, False Confessions, 73 ALB. L. REV. 1227, 1234 (2010).
336. See Steven A. Drizin & Marissa J. Reich, Heeding the Lessons of History: The Need for Mandatory
Recordings of Police Interrogations to Accurately Assess the Reliability and Voluntariness of Confessions, 52
DRAKE L. REV. 619, 639–40 (2004); Feld, supra note 173, at 59 (discussing importance of electronic recording for
juveniles); Christine S. Scott-Hayward, Explaining Juvenile False Confessions: Adolescent Development and
Police Interrogation, 31 LAW & PSYCHOL. REV. 53, 73–74 (2007).
337. Alan M. Gershel, A Review of the Law in Jurisdictions Requiring Electronic Recording of Custodial
Interrogations, 16 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 1, 3 (2010) (citations omitted), http://jolt.richmond.edu/v16i3/article9.pdf;
see, e.g., Stephan v. State, 711 P.2d 1156, 1159–61 (Alaska 1985) (“[R]ecording . . . will aid law enforcement
efforts by confirming the content and voluntariness of the confession when a defendant changes his testimony or
claims falsely that his constitutional rights are violated.”).
338. Gershel, supra note 337, at 3.
339. See Matthew D. Thurlow, Lights, Camera, Action: Video Cameras as Tools for Justice, 23 J. MARSHALL
J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 771, 799 (2005) (describing ways to obtain state and federal funding for videotaping).
340. See, e.g., Steven A. Drizin & Beth A. Colgan, Let the Cameras Roll: Mandatory Videotaping of
Interrogations Is the Solution to Illinois’ Problem of False Confessions, 32 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 337, 412–19 (2001);
Thomas P. Sullivan, Electronic Recording of Custodial Interrogations: Everybody Wins, 95 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 1127, 1128 (2005).
341. Failure to Record Custodial Interrogations Can Be Costly, LAW OFFICERS’ BULL., Aug. 1, 2001, at 2, 4
(“The long and short of it is this: If you want to give defense counsel fodder for cross examination, keep the
recording machine off. If you don’t, switch it on and keep it on.”).
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1. Suspect Concerns
From a suspect’s perspective, a dialogue approach adds an extra burden on the
most vulnerable of populations. To add a requirement that a vulnerable suspect
communicate with her inquisitor at first blush seems unfair.342 After all, it is
precisely because of her vulnerabilities that she will be disadvantaged in the
dialogue. It is certainly easier to say, “I want a lawyer,” than to explain the role of
counsel to a strange inquisitor.343 While there is little question that the communicative burden would be increased by dialogue and that this process would be
uncomfortable for the suspect, the end result will lead to a more accurate
assessment of waiver. It is precisely because it is more difficult to explain the role
of counsel than to say, “I want counsel,” or to say, “Yes” to the question “Do you
want counsel?” that more information about the suspect’s true understanding will
be produced. It is precisely in the struggle to communicate that the factual record
will be developed and will be preserved for future study about the understanding of
rights.
Additionally, from a suspect’s perspective, it might be argued that vulnerable
suspects will be more suggestible to manipulation by the detectives.344 In other
words, an experienced detective could exploit the dialogue to encourage a waiver
of rights. This is not an inaccurate criticism, but one that must be analyzed in the
context of the existing practice. As it currently stands, that same vulnerable suspect
is, for all practical purposes, required to invoke her rights under Berghuis even if
she does not have a full knowing and intelligent understanding of her rights.345
Further, any affirmative acquiescence (even if actually unknowing) may constitute
waiver.346 Finally, as the studies have amply demonstrated, vulnerable suspects are
ill-served by the educative protections of the Miranda warnings.347 Thus, the
reality is that both the existing approach and the dialogue approach can lead to an
immediate waiver of rights, but only the latter allows the relevant interpreters of
that waiver (experts and judges) to have a better understanding of the suspect’s
level of understanding at the time of the waiver. In addition, there will be some
segment of vulnerable defendants who will actually understand their rights better
through the dialogue and waive or invoke based on a more complete understanding.
342. But see Elwood Earl Sanders, Jr., Breaching the Citadel: Willful Violations of Miranda After Missouri v.
Seibert, 10 APPALACHIAN J.L. 91, 102–10 (2011) (arguing that police have used willful manipulation in Miranda
cases).
343. This assumes the suspect knows the precise words to convey an unambiguous invocation.
344. See Rogers et al., Comprehensibility and Content, supra note 226, at 75–76 (discussing vulnerable
suspects’ suggestibility).
345. This was not at issue in Berghuis because the Court assumed that the suspect understood his rights.
Berghuis v. Thompkins, 130 S. Ct. 2250, 2262 (2010).
346. See id. at 2264 (finding waiver based on fact that Thompkins did not stop questioning and made an
uncoerced statement to police).
347. See supra Part II.
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The above concern opens up criticism to a more fundamental critique of the way
Miranda waivers are conducted in practice. The interrogating officers providing
the Miranda warnings are biased toward getting a waiver and, thus, a confession. It
is simply not in the officer’s interest to explain the rights too well or be too
convincing about the value of constitutional protections.348 While police have an
interest in upholding constitutional rights at the moment of waiver, there is direct
conflict between this interest and the suspect’s right to be properly educated about
Miranda.349
A third complaint from a suspect’s perspective is that the dialogue approach
might provide inaccurate information. It has been recognized that use of a
paraphrase response350 format (as in the Grisso tests) has limitations due to
impaired verbal abilities of many vulnerable defendants.351 These tests might
undervalue actual knowledge because defendants may not be able to verbalize
what they actually understand.352 Or, the tests might overvalue actual knowledge if
defendants simply repeat back words without actual comprehension. The response
to this legitimate concern is that once these issues are identified, experts can
account for them in their analysis. Any test purporting to discern human understanding will have gaps and weaknesses. The dialogue approach improves, but cannot
eliminate, potential flaws with the way suspects process or explain Miranda rights.
More globally, scholars might contest the use of Miranda rights at all with
vulnerable suspects.353 As has been discussed, there is little scientific evidence

348. This opens up questions beyond the scope of this Article about other ways one could provide Miranda
without this outcome-determinative bias. For example, one could have a neutral third party provide the warnings.
This could be done either by an uninvolved police officer, or a true neutral third party. Also, as my colleague
Kaitlin Banner suggested in reviewing an earlier draft of this Article, one could use technological innovations
such as a computer test, akin to a driver’s education exam to explain Miranda and determine waiver or invocation.
349. As the quote from the Faulkner case shows at the beginning of the Article, many times officers choose to
steamroll past the confusion of a defendant in an effort to obtain a confession. See supra note 1 and accompanying
text.
350. See Robert P. Charrow & Veda R. Charrow, Making Legal Language Understandable: A Psycholinguistic
Study of Jury Instructions, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 1306, 1309–10 (1979).
Paraphrase testing, . . . is probably the closest thing to “getting inside the head” of the listener or
reader. In a paraphrase task, a subject either listens to or reads some material and is then required to
paraphrase it. The validity of the paraphrase task as a measure of comprehensibility rests on the
premise that a subject will not be able to paraphrase accurately material that he or she has not
understood. In addition, the subject will be more likely to focus upon concepts that are more
comprehensible and those that are more important to the gist of the discourse, and to gloss over or
omit less comprehensible or less important concepts.
Id.
351. See GRISSO, EVALUATING COMPETENCIES, supra note 5, at 167 (“The choice of a paraphrase response
format is well grounded in past research on the evaluation of knowledge and understanding. Paraphrase formats,
however, may be subject to interpretation error due to verbal expressive difficulties of many delinquent youths
(and some adults).”).
352. GRISSO, EVALUATING COMPETENCIES, supra note 5, at 167–68.
353. Some have challenged the broader assertion that the Miranda warnings can actually overcome the
compulsion of interrogation, as being without empirical support. See, e.g., Cloud et al., supra note 17, at 497.
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demonstrating that Miranda warnings protect those with developmental limitations, and there is no strong scientific evidence that they are effective with
vulnerable populations as a whole.354 Proposing a dialogue approach does not
address those broader critiques. The dialogue approach accepts the current legal
paradigm, merely adding a protective layer of dialogue to ensure better understanding.355
The final concern is that one of the mechanisms to gain the protection of
Miranda’s right to silence, “unambiguous invocation,”356 could be undone by
dialogue. One could imagine that a vulnerable suspect could initially invoke the
right to silence, but in the context of “dialogue” (to see if the suspect really
understood what he or she was doing) be convinced by a detective to retract that
invocation of rights. The Supreme Court has held that police must scrupulously
honor the invocation of a right to remain silent.357 This involves both an immediate
cessation of questioning and a prohibition on subsequent questioning unless the
suspect reinitiates.358 Similarly, with the right to counsel, police officers must
immediately cease questioning until a lawyer is provided.359 The question remains
whether the dialogue approach would undermine the “scrupulously honor” requirement because it invites follow-up questions. In other words, the dialogue could
lead to re-initiation and the re-initiation could lead to waiver.
One answer is to say that the dialogue approach should only work one way, such
that a detective is required to engage in dialogue to make sure a suspect
understands his or her Miranda rights, but not whether a suspect intends to invoke
those rights. Stated another way, no further dialogue would be needed if a suspect
says, “I want to remain silent,” because the request is unambiguous. There is no
need for further dialogue to see if the invocation was knowing and intelligent,

354. See id. at 525 (recognizing that the Miranda Court cited two cases involving developmentally disabled
defendants as proof of the need to establish the Miranda warnings system); Kassin et al., White Paper, supra note
29, at 7 (“Practically speaking, however, research has suggested that the Court’s presumption concerning the
protections afforded by Miranda warnings is questionable.”).
355. Cf. Cloud et al., supra note 17, at 497 (“This assumption is central to any claim that the warnings preserve
the constitutional privilege against compulsory self-incrimination. If the warnings do not work, then the opinion’s
entire construct is just an elaborate sleight of hand, a device for facilitating confessions disguised as a vehicle for
guarding constitutional rights.”); see also People v. Polk, 942 N.E.2d 44, 56–58 (Ill. App. Ct. 2011) (interpreting
Berghuis and providing an example of clarification through dialogue); Cloud et al., supra note 17, at 524–25
(“The assumption that the warnings are effective is fundamental to the entire Miranda construct. The assumption
of effectiveness rested, in turn, upon the underlying presumption that suspects would understand both the
meaning and the legal significance of the warnings. Without this assumption of understanding, the warnings could
not logically serve as the predicate for a knowing and intelligent waiver.”).
356. See Berghuis v. Thompkins, 130 S. Ct. 2250, 2260 (2010) (“A requirement of an unambiguous invocation
of Miranda rights results in an objective inquiry that ‘avoids difficulties of proof . . . .’” (citing Davis v. United
States, 512 U.S. 452, 458–59 (1994))).
357. See Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 104 (1975).
358. Id.
359. Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 485 (1981).
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because Miranda only requires the waiver to be knowing and intelligent.360 Such a
distinction is logically defensible, as the first promotes the underlying protections
of Miranda, and the latter undermines the assertion of that protection. However, in
the ebb and flow of police interrogation sometimes the line is hard to draw. The
response to this criticism is simple and unsatisfying—the courts will have to draw
those hard lines, keeping faith in the requirement that police scrupulously honor
the invocation of rights.361
2. Law Enforcement Concerns
From a law enforcement perspective, there are several weighty concerns with
this proposed approach. First, this type of additional discussion invites suppression
of confessions if police misinform vulnerable suspects through the dialogue.362 If
police go “off script” they risk violating Miranda by vitiating the waiver of rights.
This is a concern, but it is also a concern inherent in the current interrogation
practice. While some detectives simply read the Miranda rights card without any
explanation, many detectives ask follow-up questions and do provide extra
information as a routine matter. It is also a concern that has been alleviated by
Powell and the recognized flexibility given to detectives as long as they reasonably
communicate the warnings.363
Second, there is the related concern that the police might forfeit potential
confessions if vulnerable suspects actually understand and invoke their constitutional rights. This argument likely will not be so plainly stated, but it underlies
much of the criticism of enhanced Miranda rights.364 It is true that if the dialogue
approach actually informs a vulnerable suspect of rights that she did not previously
360. Compare Berghuis, 130 S. Ct. at 2260 (requiring unambiguous invocation), with Edwards, 451 U.S. at
104 (requiring knowing and voluntary waiver).
361. See, e.g., State v. Scheffer, 230 P.3d 462, 474–75 (Mont. 2010) (examining a transcript showing some of
the difficulties in line-drawing from an appellate level). It should be easier to justify with vulnerable suspects
because if ever there were a one-way protection that could be defended, it is to protect those who most need the
educative protections of the Miranda warnings.
362. See, e.g., State v. Luckett, 993 A.2d 25, 29–32, 37 (Md. 2010) (providing a cautionary example of
post-Miranda warning clarifications that can undermine the warnings themselves); see also id. at 37 (“We agree
with the State that those advisements comport with Miranda. The problem, however, does not lie in Detective
Barba’s recitation of the Miranda warnings we have just quoted. The problem instead lies in the detective’s further
‘clarifications’ and ‘explanations’ of the rights covered by those warnings. As we shall see, it is those comments
that nullified what otherwise were proper warnings, and rendered the Miranda advisement constitutionally
defective.”).
363. See State v. Owens, 41 So. 3d 352, 353 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010) (showing in a post-Powell case how
variations on Miranda rights will not undermine the warnings, so long as they reasonably convey the rights).
364. Much of the resistance to Miranda is that voluntary confessions are thrown out because formalities were
not observed. Compare New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 656–57 (1984) (“The Miranda majority, however,
apparently felt that whatever the cost to society in terms of fewer convictions of guilty suspects, that cost would
simply have to be borne in the interest of enlarged protection for the Fifth Amendment privilege.”), with J.D.B. v.
North Carolina, 131 S. Ct. 2394, 2412–13 (2011) (Alito, J., dissenting) (“In its present form, Miranda’s
prophylactic regime already imposes ‘high cost[s]’ by requiring suppression of confessions that are often ‘highly
probative’ and ‘voluntary’ by any traditional standard.”).
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understand (by the mere reading of the warnings), and if the suspect does invoke
her rights based on that understanding, there may be a loss of a confession.365 At
the same time, if one accepts that the justification for Miranda is to inform and
protect suspects from the pressures of custodial interrogation, such a result is
merely a necessary cost of constitutional rights.
Third, there is the reality that at the present time, the requirement of dialogue is
neither constitutionally mandated nor a rule of procedure prescribed by the Court
in its supervisory authority over federal courts. In Colorado v. Spring, the Court
stated, “[W]e have never read the Constitution to require that the police supply a
suspect with a flow of information to help him calibrate his self-interest in deciding
whether to speak or stand by his rights.”366 This remains true, but it presupposes a
non-vulnerable suspect who can adequately understand the rights in order to
calibrate.367 The dialogue approach seeks to level the playing field of waiver, not
change the game of interrogation. It remains the government’s burden to demonstrate that the waiver was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary, and thus it is the
government’s burden to make sure with vulnerable populations that steps were
taken to ensure full understanding. One easy way to overcome this burden would
be to engage in dialogue with a suspect to ensure adequate understanding of
Miranda rights.
Fourth, there is the reality that police officers are already overregulated and the
addition of another requirement to the interrogation is unnecessarily burdensome.368 This criticism misses the reality that most interrogating officers undergo
elaborate training on the subject of interrogation,369 as well as craft their own
techniques to get suspects to waive rights.370 To add dialogue simply adds a new
tactic to their professional techniques.371 In fact, most Miranda waivers probably
have less to do with “knowledge” of rights, and more to do with the trust built

365. Again, this is a serious concern, but a concern that is really a challenge to the underlying purpose of
Miranda.
366. 479 U.S. 564, 576–77 (1987) (alteration in original). It also must be noted that Spring involves the
question of whether a defendant should be able to calibrate self-interest, as opposed to the predicate question,
whether a defendant has information to make a knowing and intelligent decision about his or her rights.
367. The Court’s statement in Spring is in some tension with Justice Kennedy’s statement in Berghuis
describing a defendant as having a deliberative moment throughout the interrogation about whether or not he
wants to invoke his rights. See Berghuis v. Thompkins, 130 S. Ct. 2250, 2264 (2010).
368. Leo, supra note 56, at 622, 650, 665.
369. Brian R. Gallini, Police “Science” in the Interrogation Room: Seventy Years of Pseduo-Psychological
Interrogation Methods to Obtain Inadmissible Confessions, 61 HASTINGS L.J. 529 (2010). See generally Kassin et
al., Police Interviewing, supra note 149, at 382; Weisselberg, supra note 62, at 1530.
370. From informal discussion with detectives over the years, I have observed that most police officers spend
much time developing and refining their own ways of approaching the Miranda “moment”—meaning the time
just before they have to raise the issue of constitutional rights. Some approaches are very direct. Some are
dismissive, minimizing the importance of the warnings. Some use misdirection, meaning they are talking about
one thing and immediately segue into the warnings. I would imagine all are calculated.
371. In fact, the technique of many detectives is to start with a lengthy rapport-building conversation before
discussing the case at issue.
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between the officer and the suspect.372 If the suspect trusts the officer, who appears
to be looking out for whether the suspect understands his or her rights, this trust
grows. It is thus different, but not necessarily difficult, to incorporate dialogue into
the Miranda colloquy to build this trust.373 In some ways this suggested modification actually loosens the rules rather than tightens them and thus might be
embraced by more sophisticated interrogators.
Finally, this proposal does require officers to understand Miranda in order to
explain it. While we presume police officers are trained on the basics of the
Miranda doctrine, this proposal does require a more detailed understanding of the
Fifth Amendment if they are to evaluate whether the suspect does, in fact,
understand the rights.374 From the perspective of an educated police force, such a
requirement is appealing. After all, we hope that of the two people in that room, at
least the police officer would understand the warnings. Thus, there exists a slight
cost in terms of ensuring that that the training and education of all interrogators
reflect the current understanding of Miranda.375
3. Expert Concerns
For experts, there are two practical concerns with this approach. The first is that
there exists the danger that non-scientists (the police) using actual scientific tests
will distort the findings and damage the credibility of the scientific methods. The
current acceptance of the Grisso tests as scientifically valid instruments required
hard-fought legal battles376 and a substantial investment in scientific research. If
the dialogue approach sought to replace the Grisso tests with a detective’s
questions, this would be a well-founded concern. However, the purpose is not to
replace the full forensic assessment with the complete battery of tests, but to
develop a better record for experts to evaluate. A complete Grisso battery of tests

372. Credit to Professor David Jaros, who in reviewing an earlier draft of this Article, provided this insight that
the relationship between suspect and officer may be the most salient factor in determining whether there will be a
waiver. In fact, a dialogue approach, if conducted properly might be a very valuable tool to extract waivers and
confessions because it would provide a way for police to establish real trust about important protections.
373. See Leo & White, supra note 327, at 432–47 (discussing ways in which police officers deal with Miranda
waivers).
374. In many different contexts, courts will presume that police know the law. See generally United States v.
Hale, 784 F.2d 1465, 1470 (9th Cir. 1986) (presuming that well-trained officers know whether a search is based on
probable cause); United States v. Savoca, 761 F.2d 292, 297 (6th Cir. 1985) (same); State v. Kelley, 210 S.W.3d
93, 99 (Ark. 2005) (“We have long recognized that every person is presumed to know the law, whether civil or
criminal.”); Doctor v. State, 596 So. 2d 442, 447 (Fla. 1992) (“Law enforcement officers are charged with
knowledge of the law.”); Lamb v. State, 786 A.2d 783, 795 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2001) (discussing presumptions as
to officers’ beliefs and authority).
375. See Zalman & Smith, supra note 327, at 873 (analyzing a survey on police executives about Miranda
practice).
376. See, e.g., Garner v. Mitchell, 557 F.3d 257 (6th Cir. 2009); Smith v. Mullin, 379 F.3d 919, 933 (10th Cir.
2004); State v. Griffin, 869 A.2d 640, 644 (Conn. 2005); Robinson v. United States., 928 A.2d 717, 727 (D.C.
2007); People v. Cole, 807 N.Y.S.2d 166, 170 (N.Y. App. Div. 2005).
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(or other assessment mechanism) should be done as it has always been done.377
However, those post-interrogation results can now be compared with additional
evidence developed closer in time to (and during the most relevant time of) the
interrogation.
A corollary concern might be that asking quasi-Grisso questions during the
interrogation might invalidate the later tests. While there have been no studies to
determine the impact, forensic experts regularly conduct similar tests to evaluate
the same client about the same comprehension issue. For example, a defense
lawyer and a prosecutor might each hire an expert to evaluate the same defendant
about Miranda comprehension, and both experts (or more) might evaluate the
defendant using the same battery of tests.378 While such an effect of testing must
be factored in to the analysis, it does not invalidate the tests. Further, the
assumption that the defendant has learned nothing about his Miranda rights from
the time of the interrogation to the formal testing of the expert is unrealistic.379
Defendants are not blank slates when they are interviewed by experts weeks or
months after the original interrogation. In fact, in many cases the defendants are
made aware that Miranda comprehension is an issue through arguments in open
court, thus potentially tainting the expert evaluation.380 If a defendant is asked to
explain in his own words what the “right to silence” means at the interrogation, and
is asked again by an expert during a full forensic assessment, the earlier answer
should not invalidate the later answer. It merely gives the expert and the court more
information to analyze.
V. CONCLUSION
This opening of a dialogue on the meaning of Miranda rights resolves some of
the main problems faced by reviewing courts on how to interpret Miranda waiver
assertions. First, such a dialogue provides clarity and an objective basis to analyze
the waiver. Such information would provide a more objective basis for courts to
decide the ultimate waiver issue for a suspect who reveals that he, in fact, does not
understand the right to silence, or needs more information to evaluate the

377. The Grisso tests are simply a part of the overall assessment that must be completed.
378. This might include doing the Grisso test twice. It might also involve using other assessment mechanisms
or interpreting the Grisso test.
379. Robinson, 928 A.2d at 722 (“Dr. Filson noted, however, that the Grisso Test demonstrated the appellant’s
comprehension of his Miranda rights at the time he was tested and not a year earlier when he was arrested. For
that reason, Dr. Filson suggested that the results might not reflect the appellant’s comprehension on the day of his
arrest because the appellant could have learned about his Miranda rights from speaking with his attorney or from
having someone in jail read him the suppression motion prepared by defense counsel.”).
380. Most defendants are present in court when the issue of Miranda waiver, expert hiring, scheduling of
forensic exams, and other issues are addressed, thus giving the defendant information about the purpose of the
exam.
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choice.381 It creates a more textured record to evaluate the suspect’s understanding
at the time of the waiver.
A dialogue approach—through which a suspect explains what he understands
about the rights—prevents the court from having to speculate about what a suspect
possibly understood. For example, the majority in Powell hypothesized about what
a suspect must have understood the warnings to mean, but ultimately concluded
that such a hypothesis is unlikely.382 Such a discussion would be obviated if the
officers had, in fact, asked the defendant what he understood the rights to mean.
Additionally, this approach avoids issues raised by the dissent in Montejo that
vulnerable suspects will be confused with the re-reading of the right to counsel
when the suspect already has a lawyer.383 A conversation would give both suspect
and officer an opportunity to clarify any confusion or fill in the gaps about
Miranda rights and Sixth Amendment rights.
In addition, if the Supreme Court continues to evaluate both a factual and
contextual understanding of Miranda in deciding waiver, then dialogue becomes
even more important in determining whether the suspect had a “full understanding.” Dialogue would be unnecessary if all that was required was a factual
understanding of the rights. Once a contextual understanding becomes elevated,
however, it matters what the suspect actually knew the rights meant at the time of
the interrogation. Establishing a record of the contextual understanding is exactly
what can be accomplished through dialogue.384
Importantly, the dialogue approach is consistent with the fundamental justifica-

381. See Marcy Strauss, The Sounds of Silence: Reconsidering the Invocation of the Right to Remain Silent
Under Miranda, 17 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 773, 823 (2009) (suggesting a stop-and-clarify protocol for
ambiguous Miranda invocations).
382. See Florida v. Powell, 130 S. Ct. 1195, 1205 n.6 (2010) (“To reach the opposite conclusion, i.e., that the
attorney would not be present throughout the interrogation, the suspect would have to imagine an unlikely
scenario: To consult counsel, he would be obliged to exit and reenter the interrogation room between each query.
A reasonable suspect in a custodial setting who had just been read his rights, we believe, would not come to the
counterintuitive conclusion that he is obligated, or allowed, to hop in and out of the holding area to seek his
attorney’s advice. Instead, the suspect would likely assume that he must stay put in the interrogation room and that
his lawyer would be there with him the entire time.” (footnote omitted)). The Court also mentioned in a footnote
another unlikely scenario: “His lawyer would be admitted into the interrogation room each time the police ask him
a question, then ushered out each time the suspect responds.” Id. at 1205 n.6; see, e.g., California v. Prysock, 453
U.S. 355, 362 (1981) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“A juvenile informed by police that he has a right to counsel may
understand that right to include one or more of three options: (1) that he has a right to have a lawyer represent him
if he or his parents are able and willing to hire one; (2) that, if he cannot afford to hire an attorney, he has a right to
have a lawyer represent him without charge at trial, even if his parents are unwilling to spend money on his
behalf; or (3) that, if he is unable to afford an attorney, he has a right to consult a lawyer without charge before he
decides whether to talk to the police, even if his parents decline to pay for such legal representation.”).
383. See Montejo v. Louisiana, 556 U.S. 778, 812–14 (2009) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (discussing the
confusion that may arise if Miranda warnings are repeated to a suspect at various times).
384. Cf. Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600, 608 (2004) (recognizing the “the difficulty of judicial enquiry post
hoc into the circumstances of a police interrogation”).
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tions for the Miranda protections of the Fifth Amendment.385 The Miranda
protections were created to inform suspects of their rights in a way that contemplates individuals exercising those rights.386 By providing a space to ensure that
suspects understand their rights, the process protects the values of human dignity,387 “fairness,”388 and “innocence.”389
Finally, the dialogue approach improves the legal system’s overarching approach to all suspects, including vulnerable suspects.390 From the defendant’s
perspective, clarity in Miranda warnings strengthens both the empowering and
educating aspects of the warnings.391 A further dialogue will add depth to the
otherwise one-way explanation of information. From the prosecution’s perspective, the dialogue approach will protect the interrogation process by reducing the

385. See Withrow v. Williams, 507 U.S. 680, 692 (1993) (recognizing the values of the Fifth Amendment
which include a preference for an accusatorial rather than inquisitorial system of justice, a fear that selfincriminating statements will be elicited by inhumane treatment and abuses, and desire to protect the innocent).
386. See Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 458 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“[O]ur system of justice is not founded
on a fear that a suspect will exercise his rights. ‘If the exercise of constitutional rights will thwart the effectiveness
of a system of law enforcement, then there is something very wrong with that system.’” (quoting Escobedo v.
Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 490 (1964))); Murphy v. Waterfront Comm’n of N.Y. Harbor, 378 U.S. 52, 55 (1964) (“The
privilege against self-incrimination ‘registers an important advance in the development of our liberty—one of the
great landmarks in man’s struggle to make himself civilized.’” (quoting Ullmann v. United States, 350 U.S. 422,
426 (1956) (internal quotation marks omitted))).
387. See Michaels, supra note 150, at 1363 (“In the words of the Miranda Court, adopting this rationale, ‘the
constitutional foundation underlying the privilege is the respect a government . . . must accord to the dignity and
integrity of its citizens’ and to ‘the inviolability of the human personality.’”).
388. See id. (“Fairness arguments center on the balance of power in the adversarial system of justice. In the
Court’s words, the privilege is needed ‘[t]o maintain a ‘fair state-individual balance’ [and] to require the
government ‘to shoulder the entire load.’” (alteration in original)).
389. See id. (“Innocence arguments center on the possibility of false confessions or other incriminatory
statements resulting from compulsion. ‘[C]ompelled statements . . . are of dubious reliability,’ and the privilege
‘protect[s] us against the inherent unreliability of compelled testimony.’” (quoting Withrow v. Williams, 507 U.S.
680, 703 (1993); New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 687 (1984) (Marshall, J., dissenting))). See generally
Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652 (2004); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967); Gallegos v. Colorado, 370 U.S. 49
(1962); Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596, 599 (1948); Michaels, supra note 150, at 1366 (“To the extent the privilege
against compelled self-incrimination is directed at protecting the individual’s autonomy and the individual’s
dignity of choice, knowledge of the right to remain silent does seem obviously important. If an individual is
ignorant of her right to remain silent, then she may lack the capacity to exercise either choice or autonomy with
regard to speaking. Autonomous action presupposes choice, and choice presupposes knowledge of multiple
options. Thus, greater knowledge of the privilege against self-incrimination advances the purpose of the privilege
against self-incrimination if one views this as a proper purpose of the privilege.”).
390. See Fulero & Everington, supra note 4, at 66 (“To the extent that psychological evaluations are more
thorough and more specific to the special characteristics of persons with mental retardation as evaluees, the legal
system benefits, as do all sides in the case. . . . Prosecutors benefit from increased information that can be used to
make decisions about the pursuit of charges and penalties. Defense attorneys benefit from increased information
that can be used as the basis of argument for motions, verdicts, and sentencing. Triers of fact (judges and jurors)
benefit from having more accurate information to employ in decision-making.”).
391. Richard Rogers et al., An Analysis of Miranda Warnings and Waivers, 31 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 177, 189
(2007).
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number of waiver issues.392 In the long run, just as in the move to videotaping
confessions, the transparency of the waiver process will reduce litigation over
contested confessions. Finally, from a judicial perspective, the dialogue approach
will create a better record for decision. Judges will be able to see and evaluate the
understanding of the defendant, thus removing guesswork and grounding a
foundation for the legal decision. All told, implementation of the dialogue
approach to Miranda warnings and waiver will be a positive development in the
evolution of Miranda protections for all suspects, but especially vulnerable
suspects.

392. Id. at 188 (“The state has an interest in the public perception that the criminal justice system is fairly
administered and that the rules governing criminal investigations are clear and comprehensible to the police who
must apply them correctly or risk committing reversible error.”). There are serious concerns with creating a
system that is procedurally legitimate—a goal that can be undermined by false confessions or unconstitutional
Miranda waivers. As has been well demonstrated, the DNA exoneration cases based on confessions also involved
Miranda waivers. See Brandon L. Garrett, The Substance of False Confessions, 62 STAN. L. REV. 1051, 1092
(2010) (explaining that a vast majority of innocent suspects waive their rights like typical suspects).

